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FEE SIMPLE OBSOLETE  
 
Lee Anne Fennell* 
 
Urbanization has dramatically altered the way in which land generates and 
forfeits value. The dominant economic significance of patterns of land use 
and the opportunity costs of foregone complementarities have made the 
capacity to reconfigure urban property essential. Yet the architecture of our 
workhorse tenure form—the fee simple—is ill-suited to meet these 
challenges. The fee simple grants a perpetual monopoly on a piece of 
physical space—an ideal strategy when temporal spillovers loom large, 
interdependence among parcels is low, most value is produced within the 
four corners of the property and cross-boundary externalities come in forms 
that governance strategies can readily reach. But times have changed. 
Categories of externalities that were once properly ignored by the fee simple 
have become too important to continue neglecting.  This paper argues for 
alternative tenure forms that would move away from the endless duration 
and physical rootedness of the fee simple.   
 
Nearly all privately owned real estate in the United States is held in fee 
simple absolute, or fee simple (FS) for short.1 Every law student learns that 
the FS is the most extensive of all the estates in land—endless in duration, 
unencumbered by future interests, alienable, bequeathable, and inheritable.2  
Behind these descriptive elements lies the implicit normative message that 
the FS represents the endpoint of real property’s evolution, a more or less 
final answer to the question of how a modern society should structure 
                                                 
* Max Pam Professor of Law and Ronald H. Coase Research Scholar, University of Chicago Law School. 
For helpful comments, I thank Abraham Bell, Adam Feibelman, Eric Freyfogle, Thomas Gallanis, Paul Gowder, 
John Lovett, Timothy Mulvaney, Shuyi Oei, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Michael Pappas, Jason Rantanen, 
Meredith Render, Sally Brown Richardson, Ezra Rosser, Jessica Shoemaker, Lior Strahilevitz, Lea VanderVelde, 
and participants in a University of Iowa College of Law faculty workshop and in Tulane’s Murphy Institute 
Roundtable on Regulating Private and Public Property. Research support from the Stuart C. and JoAnn Nathan 
and Harold J. Green Faculty Funds is also gratefully acknowledged.      
1 See, e.g., JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 9.05(B)(1) (2012) (placing the 
percentage of privately owned land in the United States that is held in fee simple absolute at “[o]ver 99%”).  
Although the designation “absolute” is sometimes used to distinguish the full-strength fee simple from defeasible 
fees like the fee simple determinable or the fee simple subject to condition subsequent, the term “fee simple” 
without any modifiers carries the same meaning.  
2 See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 214 n.7 (8th ed. 2014) (characterizing the fee simple as 
“the greatest modern estate known to law”); id. at 218 (describing the fee simple absolute as “as close to unlimited 
ownership as our law recognizes” and as the “largest estate in terms of duration” which may “endure forever”); 
ROBERT LAURENCE & PAMELA MINZNER, A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 4 
(1993) (“The fee simple absolute is the most complete form of  ownership recognized at common law . . . there 
are no conditions on possession, inheritance, or survivorship. The fee simple continues forever.”); Kevin Gray, 
Property in Thin Air, 50 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 252, 252 (1991) (describing rights in the fee simple as “the nearest 
approximation to absolute ownership known in our modern system of law”). 
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access to land.3  This paper challenges that message.   
Property is a mechanism for delivering access to resources.4 The FS 
embodies a particular way of packaging and characterizing that access, one 
that resonates with a “thing-based” property paradigm.5 It purports to grant 
a chunk of the physical world—a unique piece of the earth’s surface and 
atmosphere—indefinitely to the party designated as owner. This 
formulation provided a useful shorthand for pairing inputs and outcomes in 
the mostly agrarian society in which the FS developed.6 Over time, 
however, it has become an anachronistic fiction that misses most of how 
urban property creates value.7    
In mediating access to resources, every property system must decide 
when to employ boundaries that correspond to the physical world, when to 
engage in finer-grained forms of governance, and—most foundationally—
when to simply ignore resources and impacts, effectively leaving them in 
the commons.8 The optimal mix of approaches cannot be determined for all 
times and places; it depends on which resources and effects are presently 
most economically significant.9 Granting a perpetual monopoly on a piece 
of physical space, as the FS does, is an unbeatable strategy when temporal 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1316, 1398 (1993) (“As a group becomes 
literate and its lands become more scarce, its standard bundle of private land rights tends to evolve from the time-
limited and inalienable usufruct to something like the perpetual and alienable fee simple.”). However, Ellickson 
notes the significance of different local conditions and acknowledges that “a private-property regime is not always 
best.” Id.   
4 See Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1471 (2013). 
5 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012).   
6 The development and ascendance of the modern fee simple occurred over a series of centuries, but the 
watershed event was the enactment of Quia Emptores in 1290. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1376 n.308. 
This statute, which prohibited subinfeudation of fee interests while allowing substitution, had the effect of making 
land holdings more freely alienable. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 214-15.  Heritability was 
established earlier, although the date is difficult to pinpoint, and elements of the feudal system made the process 
less than automatic. A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 49-51 (2d. ed. 
1986).  In 1540, the Statute of Wills made the fee simple devisable as well.  Id. at 191.  Entailments and other 
impediments to alienability were addressed over time.  Id. at 89-90; see also Claire Priest, Creating an American 
Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits in American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385 (2006) (tracing the 
removal of certain limits relating to creditors in the eighteenth century).   
7 There have been other recent complaints about the anachronistic nature of certain strains of property theory 
and doctrine. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101 IOWA L REV. 
91, 134-35 (2015) (observing that Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith’s pathbreaking work “paid no attention to 
public law, instead focusing on hoary common-law doctrines to the neglect of zoning, subdivision law, 
environmental impact review, and other procedures through which agencies and legislatures impose ad hoc 
conditions on development” despite the far greater modern significance of the latter); Joseph Singer, Property as 
the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1290 (2014) (arguing that “traditional legal doctrines governing 
estates in land” represent a “hypertechnical, abstruse set of rules [that] appears removed from modern policy 
concerns or values and increasingly lacks any understandable justification”).    
8 Henry Smith develops the idea that property law employs a mix of governance and exclusion strategies in 
Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL 
STUD. S453 (2002). The point that many impacts are best ignored follows from Demsetz, supra note 9. For the 
idea that ignoring the impacts of resource related decisions amounts to leaving certain elements in the commons, 
see YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 92-96 (2d ed. 1997) (explaining how an 
“imperfect delineation of rights” amounts to “plac[ing] attributes in the public domain”).  See also Part I infra 
(discussing property’s choices among the three strategies of exclusion, governance, and tolerance).   
9 See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & 
PROC.) 347 (1967). 
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spillovers loom large, interdependence among parcels is low, most value is 
produced within the four corners of the property (through crops or herding, 
say), and cross-boundary externalities come in forms that governance 
strategies can readily reach. But conditions have changed.    
We now live in a deeply interdependent society that is overwhelmingly 
urban. Eighty percent of the U.S. population lives in urban areas.10  Spatial 
externalities are no longer confined to problems of wandering cattle or 
wafting factory smoke; rather, the relative position and aggregate 
configuration of urban space now represents the primary way in which real 
property delivers and forfeits value.11 Spatially rooted estates of endless 
duration deal poorly with the problem of optimizing urban land use because 
they scatter everlasting vetoes among individual landowners over the most 
critical source of value in a metropolitan environment—the patterns in 
which land uses and land users are assembled in space.  
These patterns have become too important to ignore, but optimizing 
them over time requires a capacity for large-scale revision that the atomistic 
FS cannot provide. Holdouts—and the prospect of holdouts—routinely shut 
down socially valuable shifts in land use. To be sure, we have the brute 
force strategy of eminent domain available to rearrange things when the loss 
in value associated with existing land use combinations becomes 
intolerable. But if the need for flexible reconfiguration has become the rule 
rather than the exception in urban areas, we should reexamine the baseline 
property estate itself. Our predominantly urban society calls for new forms 
of property, ones that can relax either the endless time horizon of the FS or 
its rigid anchoring to a particular map point.  
The idea that property should adapt to match the ways in which value is 
produced is hardly new or radical.  Following Harold Demsetz’s analysis, 
property should internalize externalities when doing so is worth the cost of 
defining and enforcing the relevant property rights.12 A corollary to this 
                                                 
10 U.S. Census Bureau Newsroom, Growth in Urban Population Outpaces Rest of Nation, Census Bureau 
Reports (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb12-50.html  
(reporting, based on data from the 2010 Census, that “[u]rban areas — defined as densely developed residential, 
commercial and other nonresidential areas -- now account for 80.7 percent of the U.S. population, up from 79.0 
percent in 2000”).  In 1790, the figure was 5.1 percent.   U.S. Census Bureau, Population: 1790 to 1990, United 
States, Urban and Rural, http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-4.pdf. The Census Bureau began 
using a new definition of “urban” in 1950, which somewhat increased (in that year, from 59.6 to 64.0) the 
percentage reported as falling in that category.  Id; see also U.S. Census Bureau, History: Urban and Rural Areas 
http://www.census.gov/history/www/programs/geography/urban_and_rural_areas.html (detailing definitional 
changes over the years in the meaning of “urban”).  Urbanization is a worldwide phenomenon.  See United 
Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2014 Revision of the World 
Urbanization Prospects, Highlights 1 (2014), available at http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Highlights/WUP2014-
Highlights.pdf (reporting that “54 per cent of the world’s population resid[es] in urban areas in 2014 . . . .  and by 
2050, 66 per cent of the world’s population is projected to be urban.”).   
11 HUGH STRETTON, URBAN PLANNING IN RICH AND POOR COUNTRIES (1978) (“Urban land gets most of its 
market value not from its physical nature or its owner’s outlays, but from the presence of other people and private 
investments around it.”). 
12 See Demsetz, supra note 9, at 350. 
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principle is that property’s boundaries—the primary technology it uses for 
internalizing externalities—should change if the costs or benefits of 
maintaining those boundaries change. And there is a long history of 
property doing exactly that. When commercial air travel became an 
important generator of value, the previously harmless conceit that 
landowners owned to the heavens suddenly became too expensive to 
countenance, and estates were revised accordingly.13  
Similarly, urbanization has raised the costs and lowered the benefits of 
granting individual owners perpetual monopolies on rooted fragments of 
space. What were once nearly stand-alone production sites have now 
become integral parts of a dynamic, interdependent, urban value-production 
machine.14 Markets cannot accomplish shifts from less valuable to more 
valuable urban configurations because of the need to synchronize many 
complementary changes at one time. Yet the land use controls that have 
emerged in an effort to manage interdependencies are not designed to 
facilitate these sorts of large-scale coordinated moves. Indeed, they are not 
even well-designed to harness information about the relative values of 
different land uses at the parcel level.  
It is becoming increasingly evident that current methods of managing 
urban land use carry a tremendous opportunity cost. A recent article 
estimated that “[l]ifting all the barriers to urban growth in America could 
raise the country’s GDP by between 6.5% and 13.5%, or by about $1 
trillion-$2 trillion.”15 Unlocking the potential of urban land requires 
shedding not only regulatory impediments, however, but also impediments 
that are built into the very fabric of our dominant tenure form. To capture 
more value from urban land use patterns will require creative thinking, 
including a willingness to rethink the rooted, perpetual nature of standard-
                                                 
13 Eric Claeys has recently questioned whether property owners ever held an absolute right to the airspace far 
above their properties, suggesting instead that the ad coelum doctrine served as “one of several heuristics” that 
were aimed at giving owners rights over areas that they could feasibly put to beneficial use. Eric R. Claeys, On the 
Use and Abuse of Overflight Column Doctrine, 2 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROPERTY RIGHTS CONF. J. 61, 63, 79-82 
(2013). Regardless, the history suggests that commercial overflights raised a question that had to be resolved 
about the landowners’ rights.  See id. at 62 (“No doubt, there was a period of time when landowners, airlines, and 
lawyers were all genuinely in suspense about how airplane overflights would be treated at common law.”); see 
generally STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY (2008) (providing a thorough history of the overflight issue’s 
development and resolution). It matters little for my purposes whether one understands the resolution of that 
question as a recognition of how things had always really been or as an announcement of a change. Perhaps future 
generations will point to the use of eminent domain—or even to reforms like the ones that this paper hopes to 
foreshadow—as proof that the FS never really granted perpetual estates, but rather only contingent ones.   
14 In a sense, real property has come to more closely resemble intellectual property in its modalities of value 
production, insofar as both now substantially rely on agglomeration economies and the ability to capture 
interdependencies. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 268-
71 (2007) (describing spillovers among geographically clustered high-tech firms and their positive effect on 
innovation).  Real property theory might therefore take a lesson from intellectual property scholars’ active 
engagement with the length and character of the monopolies granted. This inverts the usual focus on what, if 
anything, intellectual property can learn from real property—and the associated concern that intellectual property 
is too overshadowed by or beholden to real property metaphors.. See Julie E. Cohen, Property as Institutions for 
Resources: Lessons From and for IP, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2015) .   
15 Space and the City, The Economist, April 4, 2015.   
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issue property rights.  
There are two basic ways in which our current property system falls 
short in meeting the challenges of the city. First, we lack good mechanisms 
for coordinating the spillover-producing behaviors that are most important 
in urban agglomerations. Second, the veto power granted to owners 
hampers the ability to reconfigure property at a different scale or with 
different sets of complementary uses. Although the two issues—
coordination and configuration—are entwined,16 my primary focus in this 
paper is on finding ways to overcome reconfiguration challenges. 
Configuration—getting the value-maximizing combination of land uses and 
land users in place—is a prerequisite to meaningful coordination efforts.17 
And it is here that the architecture of the FS most plainly gets in the way. 
To provoke thought, I briefly sketch two possibilities for revising the FS 
to make it more readily reconfigurable. The first, the callable fee, is a tenure 
form that is made expressly subject to a call option that can be exercised as 
to all properties in a designated area when particular conditions obtain.18 
The second, the floating fee, would represent a geographically untethered 
claim on real property that would facilitate either small-scale readjustment 
or longer-range relocations.19 Both would loosen the spatial monopoly that 
the FS grants to individual landowners in urban areas.  
The paper proceeds in three steps. Part I presents property as a dynamic 
institution that employs a shifting mix of three strategies: boundary 
exclusion, governance of spillovers, and toleration of externalities. Part II 
considers how we might remake property forms to better fit the way urban 
landscapes produce value. Part III addresses a variety of objections, 
                                                 
16 Significantly, it may be difficult to know whether a reconfiguration will add value if the set of landowners 
who are currently present are not successfully coordinating with each other to optimize their combined land uses.  
I consider the possibility that some reconfiguration tools could double as incentive mechanisms that would lead 
neighboring landowners to develop more effective methods of coordination. See text accompanying notes __ 
infra.   
17 Potential mechanisms for coordinating the behavior of neighboring urban land users might draw on 
existing approaches for managing large-scale natural resources.  See, e.g., Karen Bradshaw Schulz & Dean Lueck, 
Contracting for Control of Landscape-Level Resources, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2507 (2015) (examining management 
alternatives for landscape-level resources, from habitats to firescapes, which exist at a scale far larger than that 
used for ordinary productive activities on land).  Oil unitization similarly structures coordination among adjacent 
landowners whose efficient scale of ownership is smaller than the oil reserve than underlies their parcels. See 
Gary D. Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 
142 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003) (describing oil unitization arrangements).    
18 See infra Part II.B.2. Of course, the government has an implicit call option on everyone’s property already 
by virtue of the eminent domain power; what is contemplated here is a more explicit option that would price in 
heightened vulnerability to displacement. The “callable” terminology comes from the language of financial 
options. In finance, a call option provides the right but not the obligation to purchase a particular stock or other 
asset at a particular price on or by a particular date. E.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 503–05 (10th ed. 2011).  In the legal literature on entitlements, liability rules have been 
equated with call options. See IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW 14–17 (2005) (reviewing development of option 
analogy in legal scholarship). The property rule-liability rule dichotomy was famously developed in Guido 
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).   
19 See infra Part II.B.C.  
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including concerns that the ideas proposed here would run afoul of the 
numerus clausus doctrine or otherwise undermine the meaning of property. 
In fact, the approaches I discuss could be constructed from existing property 
forms—defeasible  estates and executory interests—and designed to support 
an enhanced rather than diminished vision of ownership.   
To be clear, I do not argue that the FS should be abolished, nor do I 
dispute that it will continue to be the best tenure form in many situations. 
But it should not be treated as the only alternative, nor should its costs be 
ignored.   
 
I.  ARCHITECTURE AND ADAPTATION 
 
Property’s architecture has received significant scholarly attention,20 as 
has the proposition that property can or should adapt over time in response 
to social and economic shocks.21 In this Part, I use these ideas to lay the 
groundwork for a critique of the FS.  I start by locating the FS’s design 
choices within the framework of architectural decisions that property must 
make as a general matter.  I then turn to questions of adaptation.     
 
A.  Property Design: An Overview 
 
Property is designed to deliver access to resources in ways that will 
induce investment.22 To do this, property pursues a set of strategies for 
matching up inputs and outcomes. As Henry Smith has emphasized, real 
property characteristically proceeds by placing a boundary around a 
resource and allowing those designated as owners to exclude others from 
the benefit stream that is produced within those boundaries.23 By delegating 
control over the demarcated resource, property allows owners to make and 
collect on investments or bets that play out within that domain.24 Ideally, 
the boundaries would be well-scaled (in both time and space) to fit the 
primary activities occurring on a given parcel, so as to at least roughly 
                                                 
20 Henry Smith’s work is perhaps the best known in this vein. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 5, at 1699 (“There 
is a basic architecture of property, and many features of property follow from it.”). Smith conceives of property as 
a modular, exclusion-based system, albeit one that is supplemented with governance mechanisms. See id.  
Notably, he rejects the bundle of rights understanding of property, as he has also done in joint work with Thomas 
Merrill. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property as Modularity, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 151 (2012) (describing the 
architectural claims that he and Smith have made jointly and discussing and critiquing Smith’s modularity 
approach).   
21 The seminal paper on this topic is Demsetz, supra note 9.  See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The 
Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331, S331 (2002) (describing 
Demsetz’s article as “[t]he point of departure for virtually all efforts to explain changes in property rights”).  For a 
recent evolutionary account, see Lee Alston & Bernardo Mueller, Towards a More Evolutionary Theory of 
Property Rights, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2255 (2015). 
22 See e.g., Fennell, supra note 4, at 1498-1500; Gray, supra note 2, at 304-05.   
23 Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1753–56 (2004) (describing 
property’s “exclusion strategy”).  
24 Id. at 1729. 
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internalize the associated costs and benefits.25  
As Smith recognizes, this “exclusion strategy” is insufficient on its own 
to properly align incentives.26 Activities taking place within the boundaries 
will often produce spillovers, both negative and positive, for proximate 
others.27 Where boundaries cannot feasibly or cost-effectively be 
employed,28 some form of governance may be used instead to adjust the 
payoffs around the edges of the property’s boundaries.29 Zoning, covenants, 
and nuisance law represent common forms of governance in the land use 
arena, although more complex schemes might grant parties stakes in 
particular outcomes or provide structures for collective decisionmaking.  
Property law also simply ignores many positive and negative 
externalities. This is as it should be: Internalizing externalities is costly, and 
not always worth doing.30 In some cases, internalizing an externality would 
not alter an actor’s behavior because her internalized returns already cause 
her to pursue the most efficient course of action—as where a polluting 
factory would go on polluting at the same level if made to compensate its 
neighbors.31 Even in cases where internalization would lead an actor to 
make a different decision, a legal intervention may not be cost-justified. 32 
The recipe for real property, then, comes down to combining three 
strategies for managing the effects of activities on land: exclude (through 
boundaries), govern (by managing spillovers around the edges), and tolerate 
(by simply ignoring externalized effects).33 Significantly, the optimal mix of 
exclusion, governance, and tolerance cannot be determined for all times and 
contexts.  Property’s best design depends on the sorts of land use activities, 
and hence land use problems, that predominate in a given time and place.  
 
 
                                                 
25 See Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1332-33 (discussing the problem of optimal scale and its connection to 
boundary placement). 
26 Smith, supra note 23, at 1755-56 (distinguishing exclusion from governance).  
27 Although it is most common to think of physically proximate others, time-limited estates can produce 
temporal adjacency that is also prone to spillovers. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
71-75 (6th ed. 2003)  (discussing temporal and physical division of property).   
28 Smith, supra note 23, at 1756 (“Using fences to modulate complex questions of use—such as proper 
grazing technique or optimal noise levels—would be prohibitively costly.”).   
29 See id.; see also Smith, supra note 8.    
30 See Demsetz, supra note 9, at 350 (“[P]roperty rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of 
internalization become larger than the cost of internalization.”); id. at 351-52 (positing that before the fur trade 
became established, the external impacts generated by open-access hunting “were of such small significance that 
it did not pay for anyone to take them into account”).   
31 See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 371, 373–81 
(1962) (distinguishing Pareto-relevant from Pareto-irrelevant externalities).   
32 Private bargains to internalize externalities remain possible even when the law does not act in a concerted 
manner to manage a given externality. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).  
Even if private bargains are unavailable, the costs of internalizing externalities through law may exceed their 
benefits.  See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 9, at 351-52.  
33 The first two of these have been expressly offset in existing work. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 8.   
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B.  The Architecture of the Fee Simple 
 
We can now examine how the design features of the FS fit into the 
framework of strategies outlined above.  This discussion will shed light on 
the ways that the current structure may fail to align with the demands of an 
increasingly interdependent society in which property configuration 
represents a crucial source of value.    
 
1. Exclusion 
 
The FS maps onto a set of physical boundaries from which (most) 
outsiders are presumptively excluded. These borders extend laterally across 
the earth, and also vertically above and below it—until they bump into other 
property holdings or trumping societal interests (separately owned mineral 
estates, say, or airplane overflight zones).  Property lines do not just define 
the overall size and shape of the parcel but also physically anchor the estate 
that the owner holds to specific map coordinates. In this manner, the FS 
grants an exclusive right to a spatially defined piece of the physical world to 
an owner who can (with some exceptions) trump the claims of all others to 
make use of that space.   
The temporal scope of exclusion is also notable: the FS is 
unencumbered by future interests and perpetual in duration.  An owner can 
undertake projects of any length she chooses and wait indefinitely for her 
investments and gambles on the land to pay off.34  Her tenure (and those of 
her heirs and beneficiaries) is limited only by the durability of the legal and 
political structures that support the estate, and by any caveats that those 
same legal and political structures establish or reserve (such as eminent 
domain). Uninvited outsiders are not merely excluded from a time slice, but 
rather from the entire arrow of time.   
Together, these boundaries grant owners perpetual monopolies on 
specific spatial locations. The FS thus does an excellent job of encouraging 
optimal investments in outcomes that are spatially constrained (within the 
parcel) but temporally extended.  For example, the unlimited time horizon 
encourages owners to make the right choices between chopping down trees 
now or letting them grow into larger trees35—at least if we assume that 
neither the trees nor the chopping operations impact anyone outside of the 
                                                 
34 See id. at 1729; see also FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 370-73 [1921] (1957 
edition) (discussing connections between risk and ownership, although expressing some skepticism about the need 
for property interests to survive death).   
35 This is a standard example in economics.  See, e.g., LEE S. FRIEDMAN, THE MICROECONOMICS OF PUBLIC 
POLICY ANALYSIS 709-12 (2002) (presenting “tree models”); POSNER, supra note 27, at 73 (explaining that a life 
tenant would “want to cut timber before it has attained its mature growth—even though the present value of the 
timber would be greater if the cutting of some or all of it were postponed—if the added value of the from waiting 
would enure to the remaindermen”). 
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owned parcel. In other words, the FS handily internalizes the sorts of purely 
temporal spillovers that historically led to dust-ups between life tenants and 
remaindermen, landlords and tenants.36  
By contrast, the capacity of the FS to contain spatial impacts depends 
on the size of the holding relative to the events taking place upon it. Thus, 
the prevalence of what Robert Ellickson calls “small,” “medium,” or  
“large” events will inform the question of how property should be held.37  
The parcel does not have to be large enough to contain all the impacts of the 
owner’s activities in order for the FS to work well—some impacts can be 
reached through governance mechanisms or bargains, while others can 
simply be ignored. But a pervasive mismatch between the property’s scope 
and the scope of the owner’s impacts calls boundary placement into 
question. Making boundaries too expansive can be as problematic as 
making them too narrow, however. Not only must owners find a way to 
manage the resources that lie inside the boundaries,38 expansive boundaries 
may effectively trap resources in one owner’s hands that would be more 
valuable in a number of other hands.39 In other words, there may be 
diseconomies of scale as well as economies of scale.40  
There can be diseconomies of scale in time as well as in space.  Because 
the temporal scale for human endeavors is never infinitely long, it is likely 
that a given property holding will later come to be more valuably held by a 
different party, one who is best positioned to oversee the endeavors on the 
property that will have become the most valuable ones. As long as land is 
freely alienable, this seems to present no problem; the owner simply lops 
off the portion of time she cannot use herself by selling the property.41 A 
difficulty arises, however, if the new use will require a larger spatial scale, 
because the turnover in adjacent properties will most likely not be 
synchronized. Thus, the FS’s lengthy temporal horizon can block the 
realization of new spatial economies of scale.   
This interaction follows from a key feature of boundary exclusion: the 
veto rights that it grants owners. Subject to some qualifications,42 the FS 
                                                 
36 It may not do so perfectly, however. Just as a landowner’s actions may fail to account for costs imposed 
on other people (externalities), her actions may fail to account for costs imposed on  later versions of herself 
(internalities).  See, e.g., R.J. Herrnstein et al., Utility Maximization and Melioration: Internalities in Individual 
Choice, 6 J. BEHAV. DECISION-MAKING 149, 150 (1993) (defining “‘internality’” as “a within-person 
externality”). 
37 Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1323-35. 
38 See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386, 390-98 (1937).   
39 For example, large holdings may contain excess capacity that will go to waste if it is too costly to transact 
over.  See Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of 
Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 301-04 (2004) (describing excess capacity). Large property holdings 
could also unduly concentrate ownership in too few hands.  For some disadvantages of ownership concentration, 
see Merrill, supra note 7, at 2094. 
40 See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 9, at 358.   
41 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Property in Housing 12 ACADEMIA SINICA L.J. 31, 39-40 (2013).  
42 There are some circumstances in which an owner’s possession can be truncated involuntarily. Not only 
can an owner lose her property in predictable ways by failing to pay her mortgage or property taxes, but she might 
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allows owners to stand on their rights and stay rooted in place.  The owner’s 
veto presents no difficulty when there are many good substitutes for the 
property in question. But it becomes problematic when a set of properties 
serve as strict complements in producing a larger economic benefit.      
 
2. Governance  
 
The FS does not rely on boundary exclusion alone; a variety of 
governance mechanisms exist to address cross-boundary spillovers.  
Negative externalities that pass a certain threshold are reachable through 
nuisance law,43 while less serious impacts are reachable through finer-
grained land use regulations like zoning and covenants. Together, these land 
use controls work fairly well to deal with spillovers that take the form of 
impacts—debris, noises, smells, aesthetic effects—that literally or 
figuratively come across the border from a party’s on-site operations.   
Positive cross-boundary spillovers have not received parallel treatment. 
Only in very limited circumstances can parties be made to pay their 
neighbors for undertaking acts that incidentally benefit them.44 Yet positive 
externalities are less neglected than one might conclude from reading 
academic treatments of the issue. Coercion is rarely applied to the recipients 
of positive externalities, to be sure, but coercion is routinely applied to 
producers of positive externalities. Land owners are often required by land 
use regulations or covenants to engage in certain affirmative acts for the 
benefit of those around them.45  Put differently, whenever the failure to 
provide a particular benefit to one’s neighbors becomes a large enough 
problem for the community, it will be recharacterized as a harm and 
controlled accordingly.46     
Most notably, land use restrictions often ensure that landowners provide 
reciprocal positive externalities to their neighbors by engaging in like uses. 
For instance, an area zoned for single-family homes on large lots forces 
each landowner to contribute to the neighborhood atmosphere enjoyed by 
                                                                                                                            
also be dispossessed by factors like eminent domain, natural disasters, or private lawlessness.  See, e.g., John A. 
Lovett, Property and Radically Changed Circumstances, 74 TENN. L. REV. 463 (2007) (examining property rights 
in the wake of Hurricane Katrina); Nadav Shoked, The Duty to Maintain, 64 DUKE L.J. 437, 481-89 (2014) 
(detailing avenues through which property may be forfeited through failure to undertake certain actions).   
43 This might be either an absolute threshold, or one that is defined relative to the utility of the activity. See, 
e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 782-83.   
44  See, e.g., Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 MICH. 
L. REV. 189, 195–98 (2009). 
45 See, e.g., Shoked, supra note 42; Larissa Katz, Governing Through Owners, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2029, 
2051 (2012); Robert C. Ellickson, The Affirmative Duties of Property Owners: An Essay for Tom Merrill, 3 
BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 43, 50-58 (2014). 
46 For example, in Pigou’s time, refraining from emitting smoke from one’s smokestack was understood as 
the conferral of a benefit; it is now natural to think of such smoky emissions as negative externalities. See James 
E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 325, 325 n.3 (1992) (discussing 
Pigou’s view of pollution control as generating a positive externality). 
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her neighbors, even as it secures their reciprocal contributions to the 
atmosphere she herself enjoys. Whether framed as controlling the negative 
externalities associated with less compatible uses or as eliciting the positive 
externalities that come from the specified use,47 such restrictions have the 
effect of inducing behaviors designed to benefit the neighbors.48   
Nonetheless, there are some positive externalities that are difficult for 
existing governance tools to reach.  Although there is no limit to how bad 
impacts for neighbors can get and still be reachable through land use tools, 
there is some practical limit to how much landowners can be required to do 
for each other.49 Especially difficult to compel are unique inputs into shared 
environments that cannot be reciprocally required of all owners within a 
spatially proximate area. Neighbors could in theory find ways to coordinate 
over these inputs once they are neighbors, but land use law has few 
effective tools for assembling together the heterogeneous land uses and land 
users that might be most capable of producing valuable synergies. 
 
 
3. Tolerance 
 
The FS does not internalize all externalities, whether through 
boundaries or through governance. There are some externalities that it 
simply tolerates. As a general matter, this is entirely appropriate and indeed 
unavoidable. No property form can completely internalize all effects, 
because to do so would be prohibitively costly. Moreover, externalities 
often turn out to be irrelevant to efficiency.50 The interesting question is 
whether the FS systematically ignores categories of impacts that have come 
to have real economic significance.  If so, then we must ask whether there is 
any way to cost-effectively address those types of externalities.  
Here it becomes relevant that the FS ignores two sets of external 
impacts that have become increasingly important in urban areas—one by 
design, and the other more contingently. First, because the very essence of 
the FS is a perpetual spatial monopoly, the externalities that follow from 
that design choice are an unavoidable part of the package. Although holdout 
problems are not typically characterized in this way, they come down to 
externalities: In an effort to garner more surplus for herself, the holdout 
                                                 
47 Any externality can be described in either positive or negative terms. See id; see also Lisa Grow Sun & 
Brigham Daniels, Mirrored Externalities, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135 (2014) (providing an extended 
exploration of this point).   
48 As I will explore presently, such a single-use scheme may not produce the most valuable synergies among 
uses.  My point here  is simply that existing land use tools can require owners to engage in uses that are thought to 
benefit proximate others, and that these tools are thus not categorically inept at addressing positive externalities.    
49 Lon Fuller makes a similar point in distinguishing the duties that everyone owes from the aspirations that 
individuals might strive to achieve.  See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 27-28 (rev. ed. 1964).   
50 See supra note 31and accompanying text. 
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raises assembly costs (often to prohibitive levels) in ways that harm not 
only herself but also the would-be assembler and others who would benefit 
from the assembly.51 Holdout behavior can stymie not only efforts to 
physically assemble land, but also to assemble complementary land users 
and uses in proximity with each other.52   
Second, the governance mechanisms with which the FS is commonly 
paired cannot reach certain categories of positive spillovers: those that stem 
from the unique, nonreciprocal contributions of proximate land users, and 
that generate cumulative and often nonlinear effects. While coordination 
mechanisms could be devised to reach these impacts,53 implementing them 
in already-developed areas requires assembling consent among the relevant 
proximate actors (or employing coercion to override the lack of consent).54  
Moreover, optimizing the use of such mechanisms requires first solving the 
configuration problem referenced above.  For these reasons, the holdout 
problems baked into the FS’s architecture get in the way of governance 
innovations as well.    
   
C.  Adaptation and Evolution 
 
Property can be understood as a dynamic institution, a living system that 
evolves—or at least should evolve—over time in response to changes in 
circumstances that alter how resources generate value. This raises the 
question of whether the FS has adapted, or can adapt, to the changes that 
urbanization has brought about in how property generates value.    
 
1. Internalizing and Uninternalizing 
 
Following Demsetz, we should internalize externalities when (and only 
when) the gains from internalization outweigh the costs of delineating and 
enforcing the relevant property rights.55 Thus, when a resource dramatically 
increases in economic importance (Demsetz uses the example of fur-bearing 
animals) it becomes worthwhile to internalize externalities (such as those 
from overhunting) surrounding that resource.56 Property rights that had 
                                                 
51 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 928-29 (2004) 
(describing externalities generated by holdout behavior). 
52 It is helpful here to recognize that placing land under one owner’s control is only one possible way to 
achieve coordination among proximate uses. What must be assembled is a structure for coordinating resource 
access and use.  See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 4, at 1529-30; Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 351, 351-53 (1991).  
53 See supra note 17.   
54 See, e.g., Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private 
Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 834 (1999) (addressing this 
issue in the context of creating neighborhood associations within established areas).   
55 Id. at 350-51. 
56 Id. at 350-53. 
17-Jan-16] FEE SIMPLE OBSOLETE 13 
previously not been worth the trouble of defining and enforcing become 
valuable enough to pay their own way, and too costly to continue doing 
without.   
Although Demsetz himself focused on the rise of private property 
rights,57 his logic operates in the reverse direction as well: We should stop 
internalizing externalities when the cost of internalizing them rises too high 
relative to the benefits associated with that internalization.58 To be sure, 
some of the costs of internalization—such as those of defining property 
rights—are sunk once private property has been established along particular 
lines.59 But the costs of enforcing those rights are ongoing, and may 
eventually become no longer worth incurring.  Of particular relevance to the 
discussion here is the cost of extending property rule protection and its 
associated veto power to landowners for an indefinite period of time, as the 
FS does.60   
Even when internalization is cost-justified, a choice remains about how 
to carry it out.  We must decide which aspects of resource management will 
be “automatically” incentivized through boundary placement61 and which 
features can be effectively managed through governance mechanisms like 
taxes, subsidies, regulation, covenants, zoning, and nuisance law.  Changes 
in the costs of carrying out exclusion or governance strategies—whether 
due to changes in the scale of activities that are typically undertaken on 
property, new technologies for governing or excluding,62 or otherwise—can 
alter the ideal mix of strategies.63   
 
2. Changing Sources of Value 
 
Legal scholars have recently begun to focus sustained attention on the 
challenges and opportunities presented by increasing urbanization.64 There 
                                                 
57 See generally id. 
58 The idea that the Demsetzian process can “work[] in reverse” when the costs associated with property 
rights grow too large has been noted in the intellectual property context. Jonathan Barnett, Property as Process: 
How Innovation Markets Select Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 431-32 (2009); see also Eli M. 
Salzberger, Economic Analysis of the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 27, 34-36 (L. 
Guibault and P.B. Hugenholtz, eds., 2006) (extending Demsetz’s theory to “de-propertization”).    
59 Richard N. Langlois, The Secret Life of Mundane Transaction Costs, 27 ORG. STUD. 1389, 1392-93 & fig. 
1 (2006) (describing fixed and variable costs associated with property rights, and noting fixed costs may be sunk). 
60 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18, at 1092 (defining property rules and distinguishing them from 
liability rules) 
61 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Costs of Complex Land Titles: Two Examples from China, 1 BRIGHAM-
KANNER PROP. RTS CONF. J. 281, 284 (2012) (“When a private farmer is entitled to keep a crop he grows, for 
example, he is automatically rewarded for choosing the best crop to plant, planting at the right time, weeding, 
applying fertilizer, fallowing a field when appropriate, and so on.”). 
62 A canonical example is barbed wire, which dramatically reduced the costs of fencing one’s land. See, e.g.,  
Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 
163, 172 (1975).  
63 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 8, at S462-78. 
64 See, e.g., David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507 (2010); 
Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property, and Positive Externalities, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
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are a variety of mechanisms through which proximity generates value—
agglomeration economies—at various scales within cities and metropolitan 
areas.65 A city’s or a metro area’s depth and variety of labor markets, social 
scenes, and shopping opportunities influence the value to firms and 
individuals of locating in the area,66 while combinations of particular land 
uses at the neighborhood or block level can produce localized synergies.67 
There are  large literatures examining these and related effects that I will not 
attempt to summarize here.68 I will instead make two claims about the way 
life in urban areas alters the work that property is asked to do.   
First, interdependence among landowners has made combinations or 
patterns of property holdings a much more important source of property 
value.69 For example, synergies among complementary uses together 
contribute to a given district or neighborhood’s overall energy or vibe—
collectively determining, for instance, whether a city’s downtown has a 
lively art or music scene, whether an area counts as a tech corridor, and 
whether a neighborhood is historic, eclectic, or dull. The significance of 
clusters of enterprises has received recent attention,70 along with the 
possibility that small overlapping circles of interaction could provide the 
key to understanding agglomeration’s benefits.71 Finding ways to bring 
complementary land users into close proximity thus represents a primary 
challenge, one that I have elsewhere termed a “participant assembly 
problem.”72 To meet this challenge, we need property rights and property 
forms that are good at making—and remaking—valuable patterns of use.    
The second and related claim is that urbanization has made it much 
more important to reach categories of externalities that have historically 
been ignored. Consider the owner’s veto power. As long as socially 
valuable projects that use land as an input rarely depend on obtaining a 
                                                                                                                            
211 (2012); Daniel B. Rodriguez & David Schleicher, The Location Market, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 637 (2012); 
Lee Anne Fennell, Agglomerama, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1373 (2015).   
65 Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 64, at 638; Pierre-Phillippe Combes & Laurent Gobillon, The 
Empirics of Agglomeration Economies, in 5 HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 247, 294–95 
(Gilles Duranton et al. eds., 2015). 
66  See, e.g., Gilles Duranton & Diego Puga, Micro-Foundations of Urban Agglomeration Economies, in 4 
HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 2063, 2086-98 (2004); Schleicher, supra note 64, at 1521-23. 
67 See, e.g., Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 64, at 647 (discussing small-scale “microagglomerations” 
from larger-scale agglomeration effects). 
68 For some starting points, see, for example, ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS IV.X.7–13 §3 
(8th ed. 1920), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Marshall/marP.html; EDWARD L. GLAESER, CITIES, 
AGGLOMERATION, AND SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM (2008); Duranton & Puga, supra note 66. 
69 See, e.g., LEWIS D. HOPKINS, URBAN DEVELOPMENT: THE LOGIC OF MAKING PLANS 27-28 (2001) 
(defining and discussing interdependence).   
70 See, e.g., Aaron Chatterji et al., Clusters of Entrepreneurship and Innovation, 14 INNOVATION POLICY 
AND THE ECONOMY 129 (2014); Gilles Duranton & William Kerr, The Logic of Agglomeration, NBER Working 
Paper No. 21452 (August 2015) available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w21452 .  
71 William R. Kerr & Scott Dukes Kominers, Agglomerative Forces and Cluster Shapes, NBER Working 
Paper No. 16639 (December 2010) available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16639; Duranton & Kerr, supra note 
70. 
72 See Fennell, supra note 64, at 1375, 1389-96. 
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complete set of complementary parcels from potentially recalcitrant 
owners—that is, as long as many good substitutes exist—the owner’s 
nominal spatial monopoly is of little moment. But when an owner’s 
property represents a unique ingredient to a valuable assembly, she can 
exercise the veto power in socially harmful ways. Urbanization makes 
complementarities among holdings an increasingly important source of 
value, which sharpens holdout problems and raises their costs.   
The positive externalities associated with patterns of land use have also 
become far more economically significant while remaining difficult to reach 
through traditional governance mechanisms like zoning and covenants. 
Individual households and firms are part of larger land use patterns, but do 
not internalize the costs and benefits associated with their place within the 
pattern.73 Of course, many externalities are irrelevant to efficiency; actors 
may do the efficient thing for their own reasons.74 Is this the case for the 
sorts of spatial investments that yield agglomeration economies?  
The answer may depend in part on whether the acts that generate these 
externalities are discrete or “lumpy” in nature rather than comprising a 
continuous spectrum of choices.75 If private returns are enough to trigger an 
entire lumpy action, the fact that positive spillovers benefit others will be 
irrelevant.76 By contrast, we might expect a party who is choosing how 
much to contribute to a social good to contribute too little if she cannot 
capture all the gains. In other words, decisions made on the intensive 
margin (how much to do something) may be more sensitive to externalities 
than those made on the extensive margin (whether to do something).   
An interesting and to my knowledge unexplored question is whether 
positive externalities have historically been easier for property systems to 
ignore than negative externalities because they took lumpier forms that 
made them less likely to be relevant to efficiency. Activities that generate 
negative externalities like pollution or noise typically involve continuous 
variables, often leading actors to do too much of them. Choices that 
generate positive externalities may have traditionally been more discrete or 
lumpy in nature—like the binary decision whether to attend a festival, open 
up a store, or plant a rose garden.77 But that may be changing. Modern 
                                                 
73 Cf. JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MORE NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES at 
388-89 (revised ed. 2007) (presenting “Living Flag” example from Garrison Keillor in which townspeople were 
unable to both be part of a flag pattern as viewed aerially and view that pattern themselves).   
74 See Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 31, at 373–81; David D. Haddock, Irrelevant Externality Angst, 
19 J. INTERDISC. ECON. 3 (2007). 
75 See Lee Anne Fennell, Slicing Spontaneity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2365, 2378-82 (2015); Mark P. Gergen, 
The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 997, 1013–19 (1992). 
76 See Fennell, supra note 75, at 2378-81. The same idea was explored in a somewhat different context in 
Gergen, supra note 75, at 1013-19. To use Gergen’s example, a real estate agent may undertake an optimal step 
like listing the home on a multilisting service, despite receiving only a fraction of the return from the home’s sales 
proceeds, if there is no way for her to do less and still receive any return. See id.  
77 To be sure, the choices in these examples are not truly binary insofar as one can be a better or worse 
festival participant, have a more or less elaborate garden, or open a larger or smaller shop.  But the choice 
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urban agglomeration benefits likely turn less on discrete on-off choices like 
garden planting and more on continuous choices about levels of economic 
investment in the area that might, for example, attract increased foot traffic.  
Thus, one interpretation of the growing significance of urban 
agglomeration benefits is that positive externalities, which used to be either 
largely irrelevant to efficiency or easy to capture through reciprocally 
enforced requirements, now take forms that render them at once more 
elusive and more relevant to efficiency. At the same time, the negative 
externalities associated with the owner’s veto have become far more 
socially costly, impeding valuable patterns of complementary uses.  
 
3. The Prospects for Adaptation 
 
The discussion above suggests that urbanization has rendered the FS 
paradigm more costly and less beneficial as our default property form. 
Following Demsetz, we might expect changes in property law to ensue.  
That we have not seen a shift away from the FS might be interpreted as a 
failure of adaptation. But it might also be interpreted as evidence that our 
property laws have in fact successfully adapted (and will continue 
successfully adapting) to keep the FS in fighting trim as conditions change. 
There is some support for this faith in the FS’s adaptability.78 But there is 
also some reason for doubt.   
Notably, Demsetz did not specify a mechanism for establishing new 
property rights.79 Indeed, his account was not meant to be an evolutionary 
one at all.80 In a recent paper, Lee Alston and Bernardo Mueller explain 
how an approach employing evolutionary theory might map a “fitness 
landscape,” and place property forms upon it based upon the attributes they 
possess.81 The terrain of that landscape might be very “rugged” and multi-
peaked because the attributes of property are heavily interdependent, so that 
choosing to jettison or add one feature causes the value of other features to 
                                                                                                                            
resembles a binary one if we assume there is some minimum level of provision that is necessary in order for the 
actor to enjoy any returns, and that this minimum level corresponds to a level of satiation for those nearby (or in 
any event, a level sufficiently good that they would not be willing to pay the actor enough to increase her efforts).  
See Haddock, supra note 74, at 10-11; Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 31, at 374.   
78 See, e.g., Charles M. Haar, The Social Control of Urban Space, in CITIES AND SPACE: THE FUTURE USE 
OF URBAN LAND 175, 175 (Lowdon, Wingo, Jr., ed., 1963) (positing, as a general claim “for discussion,” that “the 
continued sway of outmoded legal institutions will not be the cause of any irrationality in the long-run trends of 
urban space patterns.”). Haar’s essay emphasizes the dynamic structure of law and argues that “this country’s 
legal climate is such that any strong and persistent pressure or need will make or force accommodation.”  Id. at 
176.  Although he qualifies this claim, he expresses optimism about law’s capacity to adapt and cites a number of 
innovations in land use controls to illustrate his point.   
79 See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 21, at S333 (observing that Demsetz’s article “said virtually nothing about 
the precise mechanism by which a society determines that the benefits of property exceed the costs”).    
80 See James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 139, 
142-43 (2009) (citing Harold Demsetz, Frischmann's View of “Toward a Theory of Property Rights,” 4 REV. L. & 
ECON. 127, 128 (2008)); see also Alston & Mueller, supra note 21. 
81 Alston & Mueller, supra note 21.  
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change dramatically in value.82  In this world, it is possible to wind up at a 
local maximum and be unable to easily reach a higher, but distant, peak.83 
Small changes can make matters much worse, even if large changes would 
represent improvements.84    
Exogenous shocks can alter the relative fitness of different property 
arrangements.85  The authors’ examples of such shocks include the demand 
for beaver pelts in Demsetz’s model and the changes wrought by the 
internet.86 Urbanization represents another large shock, but one that has 
come about gradually. There has been no concentrated scramble for a 
wholly new and “fitter” bundle but rather a series of adjustments, primarily 
in the governance domain, designed around the polestar of the FS. Thus, 
zoning and covenants have evolved, but remain unequal to the challenges 
that urbanization has brought about, including the need for reconfiguration 
as the efficient scale changes.  
Eminent domain offers a more potent tool for addressing urban 
reconfiguration challenges—one that has become both increasingly 
necessary and increasingly controversial. This safety valve has remained 
doctrinally open as a matter of federal constitutional law.87 But the political 
response to such takings has hampered resort to this approach,88 even as the 
economic pressure to employ it continues to intensify.   
 
II.  PROPERTY FOR THE CITY 
 
Carol Rose once provocatively asked how our thinking about property 
might change if a resource like water, rather than “immovable, enduring 
land” served as “our chief symbol for property.”89 We might similarly 
wonder how tenure forms might have developed had urban agglomeration, 
not agricultural use, been the signal source of land value.  Property directed 
at optimizing synergies within cities’ prime collaboration space would 
                                                 
82 Such complementarity among property rights argues for making it available in particular packages, given 
positive transaction costs. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More 
Coasean, 54 J.L. & ECON. S77 (2011).  
83 Alston & Mueller, supra note 21.   
84 Cf. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 40 (3d ed. 2005) (describing a similar 
phenomenon in the land use context, where transforming an area would add value but small steps in that direction 
would subtract value).  
85 See Alston & Mueller, supra note 21, at 2268 (explaining that these shocks can cause the fitness landscape 
to shift or “dance,” and “what was a good design may no longer be able to deal with the new conflicts that arise 
and a new fitter bundle may or may not evolve.”). 
86 See id. 
87 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (finding economic redevelopment to be a 
“public use” for purposes of eminent domain). 
88 See e.g., ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND (2015) (describing the political backlash against the Kelo 
decision, including some of the ways in which it fell short). Even where legislative or judicial responses did not 
place hard legal constraints on the use of eminent domain for economic development, the anticipated political 
fallout remains a practical constraint on this approach.   
89 Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right? 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 351 (1996).    
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likely look very different from property directed at optimizing the yield of 
crops or herds. Endless time horizons might be swapped for greater 
flexibility in configuration. And entitlements might focus more on 
coordinating co-location, and less on physical rootedness. The sections 
below examine these possibilities.  
 
A.  Ending Endlessness 
 
The FS endures forever. This temporal feature has received a great deal 
of credit for appropriately aligning incentives—and conversely, the absence 
of this feature has been blamed for holding back economic progress.90 The 
optimality of perpetual rights to real property is rarely questioned, at least as 
a robust default.91 For example, Ellickson describes “an infinite time-
horizon” as “the economic ideal,”92 and views an endless estate as “a low-
transaction cost device for inducing a mortal landowner to conserve natural 
resources for future generations.”93 Demsetz similarly explains that “an 
owner of a private right to use land acts as a broker whose wealth depends 
on how well he takes into account the competing claims of the present and 
the future”94—an assessment that appears to be premised on an estate of 
infinite duration. 
 
1. Escape from Foreverland 
 
The case for reconsidering how temporal externalities are internalized 
turns on their relationship to other externalities that are of skyrocketing 
economic significance. Once we understand an estate’s length as one of 
several possible mechanisms for internalizing temporal externalities, and 
once we further recognize (following Demsetz) that some externalities may 
be too costly to internalize, it becomes unclear why perpetual estates are 
necessarily the correct length. We no longer assume that an estate of infinite 
physical height is optimal, for example, even though such an estate does an 
outstanding job of capturing the effects, both positive and negative, of  
vertical efforts undertaken on the land.95  We are, I suggest, in a similar 
situation when it comes to the agglomeration benefits of cities, which are 
difficult to realize in a system that uses as its basic building block an estate 
                                                 
90 See generally Ellickson, supra note 61. 
91 See id. at 284 (noting the possible advantages of voluntarily chosen temporal splits that would shift risk).  
92 Id. at 293. 
93 Ellickson, supra note  3, at 1368.   
94 Demsetz, supra note 9, at 355. 
95 See Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1363 (discussing shifts in “vertical boundaries” after “aircraft opened 
access to the skies, and mechanized drilling and mining equipment, to the subsurface,” both of which “pose an 
efficient-boundary problem in the vertical dimension”) (footnote omitted); Gray, supra note 2, at 253 (“[F]ee 
simple ownership cannot possibly confer on the modern landowner a limitless domain over the vertical column of 
airspace grounded within the territorial boundaries of his or her realty.”). 
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of perpetual duration.    
This is not to lightly dismiss the advantages of building into a property 
form an automatic method for internalizing purely temporal spillovers from 
one period to the next.  If we could costlessly keep this feature as standard 
equipment for property holdings, doing so would be sensible.  The problem 
is that it does carry costs, and those costs are rising, even as the associated 
benefits are diminishing.  Robert Ellickson made an analogous (if opposite) 
point in discussing the Chinese custom of dian, which granted a seller of 
land and his heirs the right to repurchase the property much later at the 
original sales price.96 As Ellickson explains, “[i]n a pre-commercial society, 
as opposed to a commercial one, non-waivable redemption rights have 
fewer costs and greater benefits.”97 We might similarly say that FS’s 
infinite duration carried fewer costs and produced greater benefits in the 
low-density agrarian society for which it was designed than it does in 
today’s  thoroughly urbanized society.   
What was needed then was an estate that was temporally lengthy but 
spatially well-scaled to individual holdings on which “small events” like 
growing crops regularly occurred,98 and that facilitated easy negotiations 
among close neighbors about “medium events,” like whether to dam a 
river.99 What transpires in metropolitan areas today is a deeply 
interdependent and ongoing mega-event. Relaxing the assumption that 
estates must be perpetual as a matter of course offers new ways to address 
these large-scale effects. Time-limited estates are not a new phenomenon,100 
nor is the idea of keying the length of a property interest to surrounding 
conditions or to the owner’s own use patterns.101 There is room to think 
creatively about how to adapt these models for the urban context.   
This is not to throw all concerns about temporal spillovers by the 
boards. Presently we deal with spatial spillovers through extensive sets of 
land use controls, not by mandating land holdings that are extremely large 
physically. Similarly, there are ways to address temporal spillovers other 
than through infinitely lengthy estates. Historically, the law of waste and 
later the trust fulfilled this role,102 and the trust model might be adapted to 
meet the challenge of managing multiple spatial and temporal scales in 
urban areas.103 Bonding mechanisms might also be employed to address 
                                                 
96 Ellickson, supra note 61, at 281. 
97 Id. at 294. 
98 Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1325 (illustrating a “small event” with the example of growing a tomato plant).    
99 See id. at 1330-31; Demsetz, supra note 9, at 356-58. 
100 For a recent comparative survey of such property interests, see generally TIME-LIMITED INTERESTS IN 
LAND  (Cornelius van der Merwe & Alain-Laurent Verbeke, eds, 2012).    
101 For example, entitlements to water may be lost if the water is not put to beneficial use. See, e.g., Daphna 
Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not Always Better than Less: An Exploration in Property Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634, 
655-56 (discussing “use it or lose it” character of certain water rights).   
102 See e.g., POSNER, supra note 27, at 73; DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 239-43. 
103 Such an approach would recognize that failing to configure property and its users in a way that will 
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more frequent turnover cycles.104 Finally, it worth observing that the 
problem of temporal spillovers is not perfectly solved even by the FS; the 
FS can and does generate moral hazard when owners can avoid taking 
responsibility for negative-value properties.105   
 
2. The Callable Fee 
 
There are many ways that innovative time-limited estates might be 
developed, and my hope is that this paper will spur interest in exploring 
them. To fix ideas, however, consider the possibility of a callable fee—a 
possessory estate that is subject to a call option after a given interval if 
certain conditions are met.106  
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the FS already is a callable 
fee. The eminent domain power enables the government to truncate the FS 
at will upon payment of compensation, provided that the taking is for a 
public use. Because economic redevelopment counts as a public use—at 
least under the U.S. Constitution107—the kinds of reconfigurations 
necessary to optimize urban agglomerations can be legally achieved through 
eminent domain. Political limits on the use of eminent domain may be much 
tighter than legal restrictions, however, often rendering this course of action 
unduly costly or unavailable. An expressly callable tenure form could 
address this gap, while reducing reliance on a form of government coercion 
that many view as unusually damaging and unfair.    
Although it would often be desirable to introduce callable fees into 
already developed areas, as I discuss below,108 it is easiest to describe how 
they might be introduced in presently undeveloped areas, such as those on 
the outskirts of an expanding city. A local government would begin by 
                                                                                                                            
maximize value also produces an opportunity cost, a flow of lost value that can also be understood as a type of 
waste.   
104 See, e.g., T. Nicolaus Tideman, Integrating Land-Value Taxation with the Internalization of Spatial 
Externalities, 66 LAND ECON. 341, 346 (1990) (discussing potential use of bonds to address costs of 
abandonment).  
105 The fact that owners are unable to unilaterally divest themselves of legal ownership does not prevent 
them from imposing costs on others if they can transfer the property to someone who is insolvent.  See, e.g., Lior 
Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 401 (2010).  For a recent example, see Matthew 
Walberg & Ted Gregory, Tax Buyer Deeds Abandoned Properties to Homeless Man, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 26, 2015, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-homeless-property-owner-met-20151025-story.html (reporting on the 
transfer of several properties to a homeless man by a property investment firm that faced lawsuits filed by the City 
of Chicago seeking to require it to rehabilitate the properties or pay for demolishing them).   
106 See supra note 18 (defining call options).  Other scholars have previously explored the idea of subjecting 
property in various contexts to implicit or explicit call options that would be held and exercised by private parties. 
See, e.g., Benito Arruñada and Amnon Lehavi, Prime Property Institutions for a Subprime Era: Toward 
Innovative Models of Ownership, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 29-34 (2011); Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U 
CHI. L. REV. 517 (2009); Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 
771, 778-83 (1982).     
107 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
108  See Part II.C.2, infra (addressing transition issues). 
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designating one or more “callblocks” in these areas.109 These callblocks 
would not necessarily correspond to city blocks, but rather would be 
aggregations of property of sufficient scale and contiguity to accommodate 
major future redevelopment efforts.110 The goal would be to identify 
relatively self-contained modules that could be repurposed in the future 
without slicing into important indivisibilities (such as tight-knit 
neighborhoods) in surrounding areas.111     
In the simplest scenario, the entire callblock would already be in unified 
public or private ownership.112 In this case, the initial owner of the 
properties could sell lots within the block to individual private owners for 
residences or businesses, while retaining a call option on those properties. 
The call option would make each new possessory owner subject to having 
her property repurchased later, along with the other properties in the 
callblock, at a price to be established through a fixed methodology (the 
strike price), after a specified interval had passed (such as ten or twenty 
years), if certain substantive conditions were met. These trigger conditions 
might include underperformance of the callblock as a whole on pre-
established metrics (property value declines, residential density shortfalls, 
lack of sufficient affordable housing, and so on). The initial public or 
private owner of the callblock properties could hold onto these options, or 
resell them as a block to a private developer or a public entity.     
The party holding the block of call options when the relevant conditions 
were met (typically, a private developer) could choose to exercise those 
options upon paying the specified strike price to the holders of the 
possessory estates.113  If the developer chose to exercise the options, she 
would be required to do so with respect to the entire callblock on an all-or-
nothing basis.114 This would help to ensure that the repurchase would be 
                                                 
109 Whether this designation would be a compensable event is taken up below.  The owner would effectively 
be required to split up an FS into two pieces, a call option and an estate subject to that call option.   
110 The boundaries of the callblocks could be informed both by crowdsourced information about perceived 
community boundaries and through market research into the sizes and configurations predicted to be most 
valuable going forward.  
111 The sort of modularity I have in mind here is related to but differs from Henry Smith’s.  See, e.g., Henry 
E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097, 2115-16 (2012).  Smith focuses on 
modularity as an attribute of property itself, with each piece of property operating as an opaque module with 
certain standardized attributes that facilitate interaction. My analysis focuses on how sets of complementary uses 
form larger-scale units that might be addressed as such.  See also Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1955, 1978-84 (2012) (recasting key debates among property scholars as disagreements about the scale at 
which to assess and pursue complementarity).   
112 If the callblock was initially divided among multiple owners, a methodology for consolidating the options 
for the entire callblock in a single party’s hands would need to be established, such as a system of buyouts.  
113 Of course she would not be obligated to do so. The essence of an option is that it provides the right, but 
not the obligation, to do something --  here, engage in a repurchase on specified terms.  See BREALEY ET AL., 
supra note 18, at 503-05.    
114 In this sense, the callblock setup would produce a kind of forced ownership – the option holder must take 
the entire block if she chooses to engage in a repurchase at all.  See Lee Anne Fennell, Forcings, 114 COLUM L. 
REV. 1297, 1356 (2014) (discussing bundles offered on an all-or-nothing basis as examples of forcings); see also 
Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, Land Demarcation Systems, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
PROPERTY LAW 257, 286 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011) (discussing the analogous point that a 
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prompted by changes in the efficient scale of development rather than by a 
desire to cherry-pick particular properties that have become more attractive. 
Once the call is exercised and the strike price is paid to the owners, the 
property would be turned over to the developer in compliance with an 
established schedule, allowing a reasonable period for transition. 
The land at this point would be reconsolidated. The developer could 
then resell individual parcels, typically after undertaking large-scale 
redevelopment, but these sales would again be in the form of callable 
fees.115 The callblock of options associated with the parcels would be kept 
intact as a unit, either to be retained by this developer, or resold as a block 
to another private or governmental party.  This would make it possible to 
again reassemble the callblock in the future, for further redevelopment. The 
government could redraw the boundaries of the callblocks at a later date 
based on long-term predictions about changes in efficient scale or 
configuration. But until it did so, the associated options would be 
maintained as a unit, enabling the entire module to be serially redeveloped.   
 
3. Design Considerations  
 
Strike prices, timing, and other trigger conditions would all require 
considerable design attention, which I can only briefly touch on here.  The 
strike price would determine the amount of compensation that the owner of 
the possessory estate would receive if the call option were exercised. As in 
the eminent domain context, compensation levels must balance the moral 
hazard of wasteful overdevelopment in the shadow of compensated takings 
against the costs of underinvestment that might be associated with 
anticipated undercompensation.116 Owners who voluntarily purchased 
callable fees could price in the expected costs of any particular 
compensation scheme, but compensation protocols could be consciously 
designed with incentives in mind.117   
For example, a certain degree of undercompensation, coupled with 
appropriate trigger conditions, could powerfully catalyze cooperative 
behavior among neighboring land owners to keep those conditions from 
                                                                                                                            
rectangular parcel system has the effect of “making the buyer take the good land with the bad”).   
115 Resale of individual parcels within a particular period could be a required part of the overall scheme in 
some areas, if one of the goals of this approach is to keep land in many hands rather than consolidated in those of 
a single owner.  
116 See, e.g., Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, & Perry Shapiro, The Taking of Land: When Should 
Compensation be Paid? 99 Q.J. ECON. 71 (1984); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and 
Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 270-
75 (1988); Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 
19-22 (1985).   
117 An interesting line of work has considered how express options might improve incentives for landowners 
and the government in the eminent domain context.  See, e.g., Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 116, at 274-75 & n. 
12 (discussing the possibility that government could acquire options to compensate only for land and not 
buildings, and citing work on this alternative); Cooter, supra note 116, at 22-23.   
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coming about and thereby stave off calls. As important, designated 
callblocks might draw together those who are best positioned to engage in 
cooperative action with their neighbors to achieve the specified 
performance measures. This outcome be a double-edged sword, however, as 
some collective neighbor behavior can be harmful and exclusionary. The 
trigger conditions (and surrounding regulatory regime) must be formulated 
with care to channel collective action in socially desirable directions.118    
An analogy might be drawn to beneficial use requirements in water law, 
and other “use or lose” rules applied to property interests.119 These too 
extend a kind of call option on underutilized property.  The difference here 
is that keeping or losing a callable fee depends not just on the individual 
owner’s use, but on that of all the owners within the callblock. The 
arrangement would operate on a principle that is similar in some ways to 
group liability, which can incentivize certain mechanisms of intragroup 
control—for better or worse.120  At its best, a tool for easing reconfiguration 
might double as a diagnostic for determining when reconfiguration is really 
necessary and as a prompt for private experimentation in small-scale urban 
cooperation. Private innovations, devised in the shadow of a potential call, 
could in some cases obviate the need for redevelopment altogether.   
Establishing callable fees in certain sectors of the city would also induce 
self-selection among potential owners based on preferences for length of 
tenure.121 Option periods for different blocks of properties could be 
staggered to create a ladder effect, so that at any given time some blocks of 
property within a city would be coming online for renewal while most areas 
would be relatively immunized from redevelopment.122 The risk of the 
property being called would be priced into the value of the property, as 
would the potential for nearby development that would enhance the value of 
the property.123 Owners who wanted a higher level of security could buy in 
an area where FS’s remain available, or choose callable fees in a district 
unlikely to be redeveloped soon (where the price would be accordingly 
                                                 
118 See text accompanying notes 169-170, infra (discussing how trigger conditions for callable fees might be 
combined with mechanisms for reducing investment risk to shift the incentive structure facing homeowners).   
119 See, e.g., Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 101, at 655-56 (examining use or lose requirements); Singer, 
supra note 7, at 317-18 (noting antecedents forms of conditional property, from homesteading requirements to 
adverse possession); see also Shoked, supra note 42, at 481-89.  
120 See, e.g., Daryl Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 378-91 (2003) (explaining how 
group sanctions can leverage and build solidarity while carrying the potential for unwanted side effects such as 
excessive levels of control).  Another parallel is worth noting: the potential that the existence of a group sanction 
(here, the risk of dispossession) will create pressures toward sorting in group composition.  See id. at 391-94.   
121 Cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Precaution, 4 J. TORT L. 1 (2011) (proposing mechanisms that would 
allow property owners to voluntarily downgrade some of their entitlements to liability rule protection).    
122 Of course, the government cannot bind itself to not exercise eminent domain.  But a widespread system of 
callable fees might be expected to concentrate development along the political path of least resistance—the 
exercise of call options—rather than through new development elsewhere.   
123 Cf. Sebastien Gay & Nadia Nasser-Ghodsi, Guarding the Subjective Premium: Condemnation Risk 
Discounts in the Housing Market, 89 TUL. L. REV. 79, 84-93 (2014) (suggesting that property values are sensitive 
both to condemnation risk and to the potential gains of nearby condemnations leading to redevelopment).  
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higher).  
Buyers must already make such calculations to some degree: An 
expanding city can thwart plans and even render property useless, and 
eminent domain poses more of a threat to languishing areas than to thriving 
ones.124 The callable fee would add transparency to the mix.   
 
B.  Rethinking Rootedness 
 
The FS’s endlessness impedes reconfiguration because of the monopoly 
power it confers. A different tack to take in defusing that power would 
involve untethering the estate from its geographic footprint.  Interestingly, a 
major conceptual component of this approach is already in place: Under 
Anglo-American law, an “estate in land” is viewed as something separate 
and distinct from the land itself.125 Anchoring that estate to a particular 
geographic position might seem like an important and obvious move, but it 
turns out to be deeply contingent. 
 
1. Assessing Anchoring 
 
Consider what anchoring accomplishes. It allows trade to proceed over 
not just the abstract dimensions of a piece of property but also its unique 
qualities (soil, minerals, water features) and topography. Anchoring 
establishes continuity of possession over the physical attributes of the land, 
which internalizes the effects of acts on the land. Trees are rooted (literally) 
and present the owner with the choice between chopping now and chopping 
later. Crops are anchored in space, so owners must reap where they sow.  
Cattle are not immobile, but their grazing imposes costs that an owner of 
both pasture and cow is in the best position to trade off against the benefits.  
Physical mooring seems essential in all of these contexts. It is also simply a 
convenient way to demarcate what is owned; there has historically been 
little need to make things more complex.   
As these examples suggest, physical rootedness is most valuable when 
the land itself is the repository of an owner’s investment efforts and the 
place where returns from those efforts must be collected. And rootedness is 
least costly when there is little anticipated need for reconfiguration. Urban 
landscapes flip this equation. In cities, it is the relative rather than absolute 
position of a land use that delivers the bulk of its value. At the same time, 
the ability to reconfigure holdings and rescale uses represents a primary 
                                                 
124 See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
125 See e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 217 (“Instead of thinking of the land itself, the lawyer 
thinks of an estate in land, which is imagined as almost having a real existence apart from the land.” (fn omitted); 
Raffaele Caterina, Setting the Scene, in TIME-LIMITED INTERESTS IN LAND, supra note 100, at 3, 4 (explaining 
that “English law . . . divorced ownership from land itself and attached it to an imaginary thing called an estate”).    
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source of value. 
It might seem that immobile structures (commercial, residential, 
industrial) also require continuity of geographic location. After all, they are 
costly to construct and often tailored for a particular user (or become so 
over time). But the need for geographic continuity becomes more 
contingent to the extent that buildings of a certain type are either fungible 
with each other or capable of replication in (or transport to) new positions.  
Although structures are costly to destroy and rebuild (or move), the cost 
may at times compare favorably to that of alternative ways of reclaiming 
prime urban land for a highly valued purpose. Currently, there is no method 
short of eminent domain to accomplish cost-effective rearrangements. 
Loosening the connection between estates and geographic coordinates could 
offer an alternative.   
 
2. The Floating Fee     
 
To spur thought about the form such an untethered estate might take, 
consider the possibility of a “floating fee.” Under this model, the estate in 
land that an owner holds is not immutably moored to a fixed set of 
geographic coordinates, but instead represents a portable claim over 
equivalent property in other locations.  Although the idea sounds unusual, it  
is not without antecedents, both in the literature and in practice. 
An important example is found in land readjustment, which has been 
used in limited ways in the United States and more extensively in a number 
of other countries.126 Many variations exist, but the core idea can be 
illustrated with an example.  Suppose a low-density residential area on the 
edge of an expanding urban center would be more valuably reconfigured 
into a higher density mix of housing, retail, and parkland.  After the relevant 
procedures are engaged for triggering the readjustment mechanism, the area 
would be redeveloped, with residents receiving  equally valuable property 
within the redevelopment area.127 Although the post-redevelopment 
holdings would be smaller and would occupy different spatial footprints 
than before, the redevelopment would have rendered the residents’ new 
property at least as valuable as the old.128  
While land readjustment can be pursued legislatively without resort to a 
floating fee, designating property in this way would allow people to opt into 
districts that are designed to be subject to such redevelopment. As with the 
                                                 
126 See generally ANALYZING LAND READJUSTMENT: ECONOMICS, LAW, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION (Yu-
Hung Hong & Barrie Needham, eds., 2007).   
127 See Yu-Hung Hong, Assembling Land for Urban Development in ANALYZING LAND READJUSTMENT, 
supra note 126 at 3, 23.  They would also have an option to sell the land. See id.  Under some models, the 
displaced parties instead receive shares of the new development or a right to buy  “an equivalent housing unit.” 
See id. at 24.  
128 Id. at 23. 
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callable fee, this could induce useful self-selection. A number of details 
would have to be hashed out: the initiation procedures, the way in which 
equivalent land is defined, and cash-out procedures for those who do not 
want the in-kind compensation.129 But the fact that this approach offers 
displaced residents a continuing place in the community is an appealing 
feature, and one that aligns with an understanding that co-location, rather 
than location per se, is the primary source of urban value.130  
 
3. Of Property and Portability 
 
While land readjustment offers the most concrete and fully conceived 
model for a floating fee, there are many other ways that untethered property 
might operate. A range of existing portable claims—housing vouchers,131 
vacation timeshares,132 continuing care retirement communities,133 and so 
on134—offer models that might be adapted or mined for transferable lessons 
(or cautions). While these examples currently operate within special-
purpose spheres, it is possible to imagine bringing portable claims more 
squarely into the heartland of market-rate housing.   
Entrepreneurs and commentators have already made some progress 
along these lines. An enterprise called Kasita has recently attracted attention 
for its plan to develop portable microhomes that will be designed to slide 
interchangeably like drawers into and out of complexes in a number of 
cities.135 But one need not create units that are capable of being physically 
shipped across the country to carry out a similar plan.136 Richard Florida has 
imagined sets of similar rental homes that households could seamlessly shift 
among.137 Although leaseholds might initially seem better suited to this 
                                                 
129 These features are already addressed in existing models for land readjustment.   
130 For recent work focusing on the significance of co-location, see, for example, Lee Anne Fennell, Co-
location, Co-location, Co-location: Land Use and Housing Priorities Reimagined, 39 VT. L. REV. 925 (2015); 
Schleicher, supra note 64, at 1509–10, 1515–29; Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 64. 
131 Although often implemented in ways that severely constrain choice, Housing Choice Vouchers 
(commonly known as Section 8 vouchers) offer portable claims on eligible housing.   
132 See, e.g., Disney Vacation Club, https://disneyvacationclub.disney.go.com/membership/ (providing 
information on a type of vacation timeshare that can be used at any of a number of different properties). 
133 See, e.g., Ellen Graham, To Move or Not to Move, Wall St. J., June 20, 2009, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204333804574159582221794994 (describing continuing-care 
retirement communities in which seniors can move to different types of housing units as their needs change).   
134 One intriguing short-term portable claim is one’s position in a queue.  See Kevin Gray, Property in a 
Queue, in PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 165, 175 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, eds., 2010) 
(“The queuer holds, in effect, a kind of mobile property in land, a portable space that is uniquely and recognizably 
his or hers and is defensible against all comers.”) (footnote omitted). The queue illustrates well how a portable 
claim over property might be defined functionally based on its ability to provide proximity to transactions, rather 
than based on its correspondence to a fixed map point.   
135 See Matt Johnston, These Ingenious Tiny Homes Move with You from City to City, TECH INSIDER, Oct. 7, 
2015,  http://www.techinsider.io/tiny-smart-homes-move-2015-10;  see also Kasita, http://www.kasita.com/ . 
136 Indeed, the fact that so-called “mobile homes” are rarely moved from their initial location might suggest 
that there is little demand for physically relocating structures from place to place. 
137 RICHARD FLORIDA, THE GREAT RESET 176-77 (2010) (describing his vision of “plug-and-play housing”).  
Florida sees this approach as an extension on existing models, such as the flexible extended stay rental model 
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approach than freeholds, a mobile version of homeownership coupled with 
portable mortgages is not beyond imagining.138   
Suppose, for example, that a set of homes distributed throughout a 
metro area were designated as “floating estates.” Although buyers would 
choose a specific home as usual, they would purchase not the home itself 
but rather a portable claim equal to their investment—one that would grow 
as they built up equity or as improvements to the home were made that 
enhanced its value.139 At designated intervals or on their own initiative, 
owners of these estates could bid to “shift their claim” by moving to another 
home within the system, dependent on availability. A portable mortgage 
could be shifted to the new property at the time of the move and differences 
in the value of the old and new home could be paid or received. The entire 
system could be managed by a governing body akin to a homeowners 
association, with the relevant community consisting not of a group of 
contiguous property holders but rather scattered holders of claims within a 
floating estate system.    
Holders of these floating estates might also be made vulnerable to a 
shift to a different home in the event of a change in land use in the 
immediate area. For some, the ability to initiate seamless moves would 
mitigate or counterbalance the risk of a possible involuntary displacement, 
especially if meaningful choice about the destination home were made 
possible by the many voluntary moves of others. Those undergoing 
involuntary shifts could be provided guarantees with respect to proximity 
and other features (along with a put option to simply exit the system and 
receive fair market value). Groups of residents could be guaranteed moves 
that would relocate them as a cohesive unit, preserving intra-group 
proximity and assuring continued co-consumption of local public goods like 
education and safety.140 Compensation for displacement could also be 
provided, scaled to the degree to which the family’s destination home 
differed from the family’s preferred home along designated dimensions. 
A geographically scaled-up version of this model could facilitate 
voluntary moves among metro areas. This too would help to serve urban 
land use needs writ large by facilitating efficient shifts of human capital.  
                                                                                                                            
employed by AVE Korman Communities.    
137 See id. at 174; see also AVE, What Is Ave, http://www.aveliving.com/what-is-ave.aspx (describing the 
extended stay options available in multiple cities).   
138 Some limited examples of portable mortgages have been found in the US. but the idea has not taken hold;  
they are somewhat more common in other countries. See, e.g., Jeffrey Lubell, Housing More People More 
Effectively Through a Dynamic Housing Policy, Abt Associates, December 2014, at 28-29 & n. 64 available at 
http://www.abtassociates.com/AbtAssociates/files/ce/ce7c306c-3cce-4dda-96c8-6098abe8a5ac.pdf (describing the 
workings of portable mortgages and noting the current dearth of these alternatives in the U.S.).   
139 Such a model would work well with a reduced-risk form of homeownership in which the risk associated 
with housing market fluctuations would be outsourced, although this would not be an essential feature if all the 
homes in the system were in closely correlated local housing markets.  See infra notes 169-171 and accompanying 
text.   
140 I thank Lior Strahilevitz for comments on this point. 
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While much of this paper has focused on the need to periodically clear the 
slate within urban areas to enable redevelopment—and hence on moving 
existing uses out of the way—it is just as important to devise mechanisms 
that can support the mobility of people and firms to the places where they 
can add the most value.  
While such an approach is not for everyone, it would provide more 
stability than many leaseholds, as well as flexibility that might be attractive 
to households with uncertain job prospects or changing family needs.  And 
it might be especially attractive to a new generation that is less enamored of 
homeownership and already comfortable navigating fluid systems like 
Airbnb. Finally, although it is not my focus here, it is worth observing that 
natural changes such as sea level rise may also create pressure in the 
direction of shifting or mobile property interests.141 The common theme is 
the need for adaptation to changing conditions, whether the product of 
natural or social phenomena.   
 
C.  Making the Switch 
 
The ideas sketched thus far are just that, sketches—departure points for 
further exploration, not fully conceived new institutional arrangements. 
Retrofitting property for modern conditions is a large project, one that I can 
only hope to set in motion here.  My primary goal in this paper is to suggest 
the need for a foundational shift in the way real property is conceptualized.  
Section 1 below discusses the nature of that shift.  Sections 2 and 3 turn to 
more practical aspects of a paradigm shift in real property’s form—
transition issues, and the interaction between limited fees and other existing 
and proposed approaches to land use control.   
 
1. From Enduring Things to Access Streams 
 
Property theory is dominated by a thing-based paradigm that 
emphasizes the exclusion strategy.142 The appeal of this paradigm is 
undeniable: Drawing boundaries around resources and keeping interlopers 
out is an ingenious way to pair inputs and outcomes across a range of 
                                                 
141 For example, “rolling easements” (which comprise a number of distinct legal arrangements) are types of 
untethered property interests. See, e.g., Michael Allan Wolf, Strategies for Making Sea-Level Rise Adaptation 
Tools “Takings-Proof,” 28 J. LAND USE & ENVIRON. L. 157, 192-93 (2013). For discussion of the ambulatory line 
between public and private ownership along the shoreline, see generally Katrina M. Wyman and Nicholas R. 
Williams, Migrating Boundaries, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1957 (2013). 
142 The thing-based approach has been most strongly associated with the work of Henry Smith. See, e.g., 
Smith, supra note 5. Although Smith claims his is an outlier view among property theorists, his conceptualization 
not only aligns with popular perceptions of property but also represents the dominant theoretical starting point 
with which all property theorists must contend. See Ezra Rosser, Destabilizing Property, CONN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016), draft at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2581710 (“Smith describes himself as the underdog, even 
though he and others who share his perspective on property are winning.”).   
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settings. These are, unsurprisingly, the settings from which exclusion 
theorists overwhelmingly draw their motivating examples. Points about how 
property is or must be structured rely heavily on a set of stock characters: 
farms, crops, herds, decontextualized single-family homes, and privately 
owned cars.143 These familiar illustrations obscure the fact that there are 
important contexts in which the exclusion approach does not work well—
from water rights144 to the urban areas in which most human beings now 
live.145   
There have been challenges to the dominant property paradigm, but they 
have primarily come in the form of pushback against strong exclusion 
rights.146  Both sides in the exclusion debate seem to agree that the core of 
value lies inside the boundaries, and the only question is who will be 
allowed to get at it. The message here is different.  There is nothing (much) 
of value inside property boundaries unless the right things are happening 
outside those property boundaries. Assigning people rights in physical 
space for a period of time remains a way of delivering access to a 
consumption stream, but that stream is fed and diverted by acts undertaken 
by many parties both on and off the parcel.147  And one of the primary ways 
in which the consumption stream is enriched is through property 
reconfiguration that enables development at different scales.  
Maintaining dominion over a physical thing in perpetuity is no longer a 
particularly good way of ensuring access to the relevant stream of resources 
over time. Just as advances in cloud-based computing have made continuity 
in individually owned devices less crucial than it once was, so too may we 
come to understand buildings and plots of land less as ultimate repositories 
of value than as mechanisms for accessing value that resides elsewhere.148 
Seeing real property as primarily constituting “portal rights” into the 
                                                 
143 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 5, at 1702-06 (using examples of cars and “Blackacre”); id. at 1720-21 
(discussing “fencing in” rule to address wandering cattle); Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. 
L. REV. 2061, 2071-72 (2012) (giving “archetypical example” of an American family farm); Thomas W. Merrill, 
Property as Modularity, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 151, 155-57 (2012) (discussing how a farmer who owns “the 
proverbial Blackacre” can expand holdings modularly by adding more land, a tractor, a barn, livestock and so on, 
and noting in passing that “a similar story can be told about the factory owner, the owner of an apartment 
complex, and so on and so forth.”); id. at 161-62 (discussing crop examples); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 388-91 (2001) (discussing cattle 
fencing, based on Robert Ellickson’s study in Shasta County); id. at 361-62 (citing and discussing Blackstone on 
the importance of protecting the right to reap where one has sown); see also Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Private 
Law Theory: A Comment on Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 133, 140 (2012) ( “The Law of 
Things uses land and cars as paradigm cases of property.”) (discussing Smith, supra note 5). 
144 Claeys, supra note 143, at 140-41 (criticizing Smith’s approach for marginalizing riparian rights).   
145 See supra note 10. 
146 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 745, 746-48 (2009). 
147 Contrast this very different understanding of the returns to ownership, which is prefaced by agricultural 
examples:  “Property is like a profit-sharing plan in which 100% of the profits go to the individual profit center, or 
an incentive compensation scheme in which 100% of the compensation is in stock options.”  Merrill, Property as 
Modularity, supra note 143, at 162.   
148 See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 130, at 941-42. 
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surrounding urban value creation machine, rather an as owned patch of 
earth, illuminates the real end and aim of ownership—delivering access to 
resources. Some continuity of physical possession is important to that 
enterprise, but how much? Something well short of eternity, I posit, can do 
nicely.  
The mental shift I am urging here is echoed in some ways by 
innovations in the so-called sharing economy.  Access to resources, not the 
ownership of things, is increasingly becoming the coin of the realm. Finding 
functional ways to deliver that access is the overarching enterprise. The 
business model of an Airbnb or a Zipcar cannot, of course, be extended in a 
simplistic way to all of property ownership—continuity of possession 
continues to generate benefits that cannot be replicated through finely-sliced 
use rights. But neither should we neglect the lesson that traditional 
ownership of enduring objects is only one way, and often not the best way, 
to gain access to valuable resources.   
 
2. Transition Issues 
 
A primary rationale behind floating and callable fees is to ease future 
transitions when the scale of efficient use changes and there is an 
accompanying need to reconfigure holdings and uses.  But what about the 
initial transition that is required to get such a system of limited fees started 
in the first place?  We can, of course, simply posit a clean slate—a set of 
properties that have been cleared through traditional eminent domain or that 
happen to be under the control of a developer or other single owner 
already.149 In these contexts, it would be possible to simply sell individual 
parcels subject to options. But it would make little sense to limit floating 
and callable fees to these contexts.  The places where reconfiguration is 
likely to be most valuable going forward may very well be already 
developed and fragmented among many owners. Moreover, concerns about 
eminent domain form part of the rationale for using limited fees to ease 
reconfiguration.   
Suppose, then, that a local government wished to introduce a callable or 
floating fee district in an existing, already-developed area. To accomplish 
this result, the entitlements held by each existing owner would be 
effectively downgraded from an FS to a type of defeasible fee, one subject 
to an option that can be exercised upon specified conditions and within 
specified time windows, for specified levels of compensation.150 One 
                                                 
149 See text accompanying supra note 108 (positing such a clean slate, for expository simplicity).   
150 The callable fee would contemplate cash compensation while the floating fee might be characterized as 
providing in-kind compensation. The move to a floating fee could be understood as replacing a fixed estate with a 
portable one at the time the limited estate is established; in-kind compensation for the fixed estate comes in the 
form of the portable estate and the associated reciprocal benefits of making the surrounding estates portable as 
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possibility would be to condemn the rights associated with the option to call 
or move the estate, with compensation provided. Alternatively, a 
supermajority vote might be legislatively prescribed in order to form the 
district, as with compulsory unitization in the oil and gas context.151 The 
latter approach might be attractive where the designated community as a 
whole stands to gain from the associated future flexibility.152   
 As a doctrinal matter, it is not evident that the kind of adjustment in 
tenure form contemplated here represents a compensable taking in itself, 
assuming compensation would be provided at the point when displacement 
actually occurs. Suppose the option to which the land is made subject 
complies with the standards for the exercise of eminent domain in the 
jurisdiction—that is, the strike price constitutes just compensation and the 
conditions for calling or relocating the estate qualify the shift as one for 
public use.  If the trigger conditions for calls and moves are set up to enable 
reconfiguration only when another configuration is likely to produce higher 
value, the latter condition would seem to be met,153 and the former 
condition would be satisfied as long as at least fair market value is provided 
to owners.154 In such a case, it would not seem that the mere shift to a 
callable or floating fee would require separate compensation. The explicit 
option would merely track the substance of the implicit option that the 
power of eminent domain already embodies.  
This is not to suggest that no change has been introduced, or that no one 
has been disadvantaged relative to the status quo ante.  To the extent that 
limited property forms of the nature contemplated here lower the political 
price of displacement, people may run a higher risk of displacement.155 
Some transition relief might therefore be provided to those placed more 
immediately at risk of displacement, funded by those in areas that remain in 
                                                                                                                            
well.   
151 See Libecap, supra note 17, at 161-62; see also Nelson, supra note 54, at 834 (proposing supermajority 
rule for creating new neighborhood associations in existing communities).   
152 These supermajority alternatives would resemble in some respects the land assembly districts proposed 
by Michael Heller and Rick Hills.  Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
1465 (2008), although differences may exist depending on what decisions the vote procedure is used to resolve 
(e.g., whether it applies to the initial decision to form a floating fee district, or to particular decisions to undertake 
rearrangements once such a district exists).   
153 There is some question whether a legislative body could set in advance criteria for public use and then 
allow a private party to proceed when those criteria are met.  Making the criteria objective and verifiable would 
help, but courts would likely demand an individualized determination in each case that the shift would serve a 
public purpose—and might not look kindly on rubber-stamp approvals. See Southwestern Illinois Development 
Authority v. National City Environmental L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 10 (2002) (finding that a development authority’s 
attempted condemnation on behalf of a private party “was not clothed in an independent, legitimate governmental 
decision to further a planned public use”).   
154 Floating fees would characteristically provide compensation in kind, but including a fair market buyout 
option would likely address compensation concerns.  See Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, “Paying” for the 
Change: Using Eminent Domain to Secure Exactions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 VA. L. REV. 1801, 1843-
44 (1995) (discussing the constitutional status of an arrangement allowing monetary just compensation to be 
waived in favor of in-kind compensation).    
155 This point is considered in depth below.  See infra Part III.C.  
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FS or are made subject to options that can be exercised further in the future.  
In considering the appropriate level of compensation, however, it is 
important to recognize that there is a form of in-kind compensation that is 
reciprocally distributed to the population at the same time that this 
disadvantage is introduced: the greater flexibility that comes from having 
others nearby similarly subject to a limited fee that permits easier 
reconfiguration.156   
An analogy might be drawn to other historical transitions that property 
law has made among tenure forms, such as the elimination of the fee tail.  
The fee tail came to be regarded as an obstacle to social goals, and was 
ultimately done away with, even though this inevitably truncated some 
interests and enlarged others.157 Converting the FS to a floating or callable 
fee would similarly strip away the veto rights that impede the achievement 
of social goals. This would curtail the rights of owners in some respects 
while simultaneously granting them greater access to the prospect of 
valuable reconfiguration.   
 
3. Connecting to Other Approaches 
 
What would the adoption of callable or floating fees mean for existing 
land use controls and proposed reforms?  One possibility is that land use 
controls could be loosened to permit more risk-taking and experimentation, 
now that there is an orderly process for revising missteps and weeding out 
failures.158  To the extent that some land use controls can be understood as 
prophylactic measures designed to preserve future options, the need would 
be obviated by explicit options capable of addressing later concerns.  For 
example, it is sometimes suggested that minimum lot sizes are meant to 
protect against excessive spatial fragmentation, based on the idea that 
reassembly would be far more difficult to accomplish at a later time.159 
Keeping property in one large tract when it is more efficiently divided into 
multiple pieces preserves an option to use the property at the large-tract 
scale in the future, but it also carries an opportunity cost—one that is 
unnecessary if the option can be preserved in other ways. 
More interesting is the potential effect that these tenure forms might 
                                                 
156 Cf. Gay & Nasser-Ghodsi, supra note 123, at 84-93. 
157 See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 225; Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to 
Private Property, 19 J. L. ECON. 467, 471 (discussing Jefferson’s bill to abolish the entail in Virginia and quoting 
his rationale, which included the idea that natural rights would not be deprived, but rather enlarged).   
158 A more pessimistic account would focus on the new opportunities that revised tenure forms might 
provide for government to extract value from private parties.  But our present system of land use already carries 
these risks, and it is unclear why tenure forms that provide more opportunities for redevelopment would make 
matters worse. 
159 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1173 (1999) 
(“[T]he dynamics of the one-way ratchet of fragmentation suggest another logic for minimum lot sizes: to 
counteract market forces that might lead individuals to break up land too much.”).   
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have on small-scale private land use controls, such as systems of covenants. 
As already suggested, the callable fee could induce collective action aimed 
at staving off calls, and might consequently produce innovative mechanisms 
for fostering and harnessing cooperative efforts. This approach is not 
without risk. Private solutions can be as coercive as public ones,160 and 
long-range projects with large but deferred payoffs may be undervalued in a 
system that makes continuity contingent on performance.161 But requiring 
the unit to effectively “justify its existence” over a long enough period of 
time could have a galvanizing effect in producing bottom-up solutions to 
the collective problems of urban life: namely, how to get parties to act in 
ways that will generate valuable positive spillovers and make the most of 
complementarities.    
One way to understand the challenge is to see urban energy or vibrancy 
as a kind of “landscape level” resource that must be collectively managed at 
a scale greater than the everyday activities that take place on the property.162  
A number of alternatives exist, from separate ownership of the landscape 
level resource itself to institutional arrangements that allow owners to work 
together to optimize the shared resource. A unitization approach has been 
used extensively in oil and gas contexts, where reserves exist at a scale 
larger than the efficient use of the surface parcel. There, owners create a 
decisionmaking body that will make optimal decisions about the resource 
and equitably split up costs and revenues.163  This model is similar to the 
trust, which emerged to solve an analogous problem of misaligned temporal 
scales.164 In the urban context, such an approach could build on existing 
structures like business improvement districts (BIDs)165 and proposed 
variations like block-level improvement districts (BLIDs).166  
Floating fees, at least those following the land readjustment model, 
                                                 
160 See, e.g., Stephen Clowney, Rule of Flesh and Bone: The Dark Side of Informal Property Rights, 2015 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 59.   
161 There are obvious parallels to academic tenure (and other forms of job security) here.  Reevaluation (at 
the extreme, periodically “reinterviewing” for one’s job) may keep incentives sharp, but these advantages must be 
weighed against potential demoralization and the benefits of allowing people to engage in long-range projects 
without obvious near-term payoffs.  See also Singer, supra note 7, at 317-18 (noting the value judgments inherent 
in choosing whether to make continued possession of property contingent rather than presumptive).   
162 See Schulz & Lueck, supra note 17.   
163 However, there are difficulties in initially establishing unitization, often requiring some form of coercion.  
Libecap, involuntary unitization.   
164 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 73 (6th ed. 2003) (analogizing the trust to 
unitization).  The trust developed as a way to ease interactions among holders of present and future interests. A 
trustee holds legal title in the full fee simple interest while beneficiaries of the trust hold equitable versions of 
standard property interests, such as life estates and remainders. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 
295-97.  In an urban area, a trust-like structure might be employed to nest physically smaller equitable holdings 
within larger legal ownership. 
165 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time?: Business Improvement Districts and Urban 
Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365 (1999). Although BIDs allow proximate owners to impose taxes on 
themselves and to spend the revenues pursuing shared goals, they do not have a formalized system in place for 
splitting up the benefits that are thereby realized. 
166 Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75 (1998) (proposing 
BLIDs).  
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provide a different set of incentives for cooperation.  The fact that anyone 
might later end up in another spatial position within the community gives 
everyone at least a limited stake in the fate of all portions of the community.  
This is a synthetic entwining of ownership interests that replicates in some 
measure the scattered strips of the semicommons, which similarly blurred 
ownership lines and helped to align incentives.167 Other opportunities for 
both cooperation and conflict would arise for floating fee owners when land 
is reallocated. Finding an appropriate algorithm for collecting and 
prioritizing preferences is no easy matter, as disputes over mundane types 
of portable claims—office space in a new building, for example—attests.168 
At the same time, however, the floating fee offers the capacity for 
collaboration directed at maximizing the joint returns from a given 
reconfiguration.   
Finally, callable or floating fees might interact in interesting ways with 
other land use innovations that have been discussed in recent years.  To take 
one example that I have focused on previous work, a shared equity or 
reduced risk form of homeownership might mesh well with a callable or 
floating fee if the latter structures offered more predictable time windows 
for settling up with investors over gains and losses.169 One of the difficulties 
associated with offloading housing market risk onto investors is that the 
expected returns depend on how long the owner holds onto the property—
and this is unpredictable.170 If property became vulnerable to calls or 
reconfigurations at predictable intervals, those intervals could provide 
natural points for payouts to investors (if area home values have gone up) or 
payments to homeowners (if area home values have gone down).   
The potential for a new homeownership form to buffer investment 
losses and truncate investment gains would also interact with incentives 
surrounding the exercise of calls or reconfigurations, with the specific 
effects depending on the compensation protocols in place.  A combination 
of investment protection against market fluctuations and incentives to meet 
governmentally established metrics in order to retain possession could work 
an interesting change in the way that people think about ownership. These 
changes might, for example, invert NIMBYism.  In place of risk-averse 
                                                 
167 See Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.  
131–69 (2000).  A similar approach, which might be used more broadly, would synthetically interlock the 
holdings of individual owners through the use of derivative instruments keyed to neighboring owners’ property 
values, stock prices, or other economic variables. Again, the goal would be to make each owner share to a greater 
extent in the fortunes of her neighbors.    
168 RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING 270-76 (2015) (describing the office-allocation difficulties 
associated with the Booth School of Business’s move to a new building).   
169 For background on existing models, see Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
1047, 1063-70 (2008) and sources cited therein.  
170 See, e.g., Andrew Caplin et al., Shared-Equity Mortgages, Housing Affordability, and Homeownership,18 
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 209, 219 (2007) (“The long and unpredictable nature of the payoff period appears to 
have been the chief reason that the Bank of Scotland withdrew its shared-equity mortgages from the market”). 
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homeowners who reflexively fight all change to protect resale values, a new 
style of owners might be willing to take positive expected-value bets with 
respect to development in order to earn the right to remain.171   
 
III.  OBJECTIONS 
 
Any suggested change in existing property forms might be expected to 
produce strong resistance. Property is an inherently conservative institution 
that is designed to entrench claims and protect expectations, not upend 
them. Yet property cannot work without some degree of dynamism.172 
Property thus illustrates well Lon Fuller’s point that a foundational social 
design challenge is “that of maintaining a balance between supportive 
structure and adaptive fluidity.”173 The premise of this paper is that our 
existing property forms are long on supportive structure but too short on 
adaptive fluidity, and that recalibration is warranted.  
This Part anticipates several objections. I start by addressing the  
standard question of how any idea can be a good one if it has not already 
been implemented.  I then turn to a set of theoretical concerns associated 
with altering property forms in the ways suggested here, including the 
worry that the resulting arrangement is too weak to count as property or 
runs afoul of the numerus clausus principle.  Finally, I consider a primary 
normative objection to making property less rooted or permanent—that it 
will result in harmful forms of displacement and associated identity loss for 
people and communities.   
 
A.  Why Don’t We See It? 
 
A standard response to any proposed innovation in property (or any 
other area of the law) runs like this: If this were such a good idea, wouldn’t 
private parties already be clamoring to adopt it on their own? Doesn’t the 
fact that we don’t observe it in the real world establish its lack of value?   
As an initial matter, it is worth reiterating that we do see models that 
involve time limited or floating estates already, both in the U.S. and in other 
countries—from vacation timeshares to retirement homes to land 
readjustment to all manner of usufructs. Eminent domain provides us with a 
                                                 
171 Such a result would fit with behavioral findings suggesting that people are loss averse rather than 
uniformly risk averse, and more willing take risks to avoid a result that would be framed as a loss than to obtain a 
result that would be framed as a gain. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 
AM. PSYCHOL. 341, 342-43 (1984).    
172 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 28 (rev. ed. 1964) (describing the tension between stability 
and dynamism in contract and property, in which too little stability presents the risk that “exchange would lose its 
anchorage,” while too much rigidity means that “society’s effort to direct its resources toward their most effective 
use is frustrated by a system of vested personal and institutional interests”).    
173 Id. at 29.   
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callable fee as well, if a much maligned one. The question, then, is not 
whether there is demand for these kinds of alternatives—clearly there is—
but rather why private innovation has not produced more comprehensive 
versions of them that could generate solutions to urban land use challenges. 
There are at least three reasons we might see this shortfall, other than 
intrinsic lack of merit.  
First, private parties may have difficulty introducing a new way of 
holding property without the imprimatur of government. It is not just a 
matter of getting potential buyers to accept the new form, but also lenders 
and loan guarantors who are wedded to standardized forms.  
Second, the options retained by a private party would be close to 
valueless unless the local government was willing to approve—and commit 
itself in advance to approving—the larger scale projects that would be made 
possible by the option’s exercise. Likewise, the private party would be 
gambling on the government not undertaking some protective measure that 
would prevent exercise of the options against the current wishes of the 
possessory owners.174   
Third, some of the places where callable and floating fees would be 
most valuable are places in which ownership is presently dispersed among 
many owners. Government involvement would likely be necessary to 
consolidate ownership in such places before a private party would be in a 
position to experiment with the approaches discussed here.  But a developer 
would be unlikely to win that form of government intervention based on a 
possible future development project that the developer now only wishes to 
amass options on exercising.   
To be sure, these points only cast doubt on the claim that the 
nonexistence of these property forms indicates their lack of value.  They do 
not establish the opposite proposition: that positive value could be derived 
from these innovations.  And one might argue that these arguments prove 
too much.  If it is really the case that uncertainty about future government 
actions helps to explain private reluctance to initiate these forms, wouldn’t 
the same uncertainty operate to quash private participation even under a 
governmentally-sponsored system of callable or floating fees?  Because the 
government cannot legally bind itself not to act in certain ways in the 
future, what would keep it from  bowing to political pressure and unwinding 
the limited fees (to the detriment of the option holders) once the possessory 
owners had ensconced themselves in their properties?175  
                                                 
174 Such a move to eliminate bargained-for value might or might not amount to a compensable taking.  
Compare Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) with Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (reaching different results when statutes regulating coal mining effectively 
eliminated  the value associated with the “support estate” recognized by Pennsylvania law).  
175 Cf. Donald Clarke, China’s Stealth Urban Land Revolution, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 323, 352-58 (2014) 
(assessing the potential for political action to turn time-limited, renewable urban land use rights in China into 
perpetual ones).     
17-Jan-16] FEE SIMPLE OBSOLETE 37 
There are a couple of responses.  For one thing, granting actual property 
interests to third parties is a form of precommitment that is harder to undo, 
at least to the extent that it creates interests that, if eliminated, would be 
compensable takings.  A better answer is that a government that plans ahead 
to create these limited fees is likely to face lower political barriers in 
allowing the already conveyed interests to play out as planned than it would 
in initiating eminent domain anew. This does not mean that local 
governments might not unwind these interests under some circumstances, 
only that the ability to facilitate economic redevelopment through inaction 
could be a valuable asset for governmental entities faced with increasing 
economic pressures.  Moreover, local governments would be in a position to 
incentivize initial developer participation in these approaches, generating 
momentum and credibility for the approach in a way that would be difficult 
to replicate privately.   
In short, the problems that I identify with existing property forms are 
not amenable to ordinary market solutions.  For one thing, land use markets 
are not ordinary markets; instead, they are highly regulated arenas in which 
the rights to engage in uses are not objects of commerce but rather the 
subjects of complex political negotiations. Equally significant, the turnover 
in individual neighboring properties is not synchronized in a way that would 
enable large-scale changes in use. Land assembly can be accomplished 
through eminent domain, but eminent domain is not a market solution.  
Of course, private parties can attempt to amass large assemblages of 
land on their own, using buying agents and the like to get around holdout 
problems.176 But even when this strategy is successful, it concentrates 
ownership in a way that can generate normative concerns.  And there can be 
inefficiencies associated with consolidating ownership for all purposes at a 
scale much larger than that which is best suited to the ordinary value-
generating activities taking place on the property. Doing so solves one set of 
problems (managing the coordination among separate owners) at the cost of 
introducing another set of problems (managing the internal interactions 
among different agents, such as employees or tenants).177    
What is unique about the approach here, and what requires the 
coordinating involvement of government, is the possibility of repeatedly 
assembling and reassembling the most valuable complementary land uses—
all without the need to continually maintain the entire operation under a 
single owner’s control.   
 
                                                 
176 See Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain: A Rationale Based on Secret 
Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 18–24 (2006). 
177 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Property Gone Wrong?  
 
The next set of objections sounds in property theory and asks whether 
the approaches suggested here would move us away from what property is 
foundationally meant to be and do.  First I address the question of whether 
the limited estates discussed here would fatally weaken property. Second, I 
consider whether the numerus clausus principle ought to be regarded as an 
impediment to these sorts of innovations. 
 
1. Too Weak?  
 
The analysis above explained why a tenure form that moved away from 
the FS’s particular architecture would not cease to be property. But would 
such a form of property be too weak to be attractive to anyone? To answer 
the question, we must compare it not to an idealized version of property but 
to the FS as it operates on the ground and as it might be adapted to urban 
conditions going forward.  
In terms of protecting the option to stay in place, the stalwart FS is only 
as strong as the current political resistance to the application of eminent 
domain.178 We do not have a property form that guarantees the right to stay 
in place forever.179 Yet even a strong right to stay in the same physical 
location indefinitely does little to protect what gives property most of its 
value—its position relative to other uses. What will happen (or fail to 
happen) nearby remains a gamble, no matter how strong the right to 
remain.180 Property rights may well be more valuable in a system that is 
good at putting complementary uses together, even at some displacement 
risk.    
Remaking the tenure form may also give the average citizen property 
rights that are stronger than they would be likely to enjoy under alternative 
models.  For example, expanding the scope of holdings under one owner’s 
control can harness synergies among uses without upending the FS.181 But 
                                                 
178 This statement assumes that politics, not constitutional doctrine, provide the binding constraint against 
the use of eminent domain to reconfigure property in urban areas.  See text accompanying supra note 107.   
179 It might seem that owners who keep their properties in high-value uses would be largely immune to 
eminent domain. This might be generally true as a political matter, but it remains contingent for that same reason.  
Even if we assume that condemning authorities can unfailingly recognize and protect efficient uses on the merits, 
the fact that a given owner’s use is high-value for the current parcel size does not mean that another use at a 
different scale might not generate more value. Similarly, even if the owner’s current use is optimal, it might be 
embedded within an area that contains many suboptimal uses; eminent domain might target the area as a whole. 
See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (nonblighted store can be condemned along with blighted neighboring 
properties in order to redevelop the entire area).    
180 See STRETTON, supra note 11, at 39 (explaining that within large, complex cities, the location choice of a 
firm or household “consists chiefly in guessing at other people’s future locational and investment decisions” and 
is thus “chiefly a gamble on other people’s externalities”) (emphasis in original).   
181 For example, Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman have proposed an approach modeled on the one 
that shopping malls use to manage asymmetric spillovers among anchor stores and smaller stores, which is 
premised on bringing a block of uses under single ownership.  See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 64; 
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such approaches rely on consolidating ownership in a smaller number of 
hands.  Most economic actors—that is, all those operating within the large 
envelope of the single entity’s control—would hold diminished property 
interests, such as leaseholds. And, not incidentally, achieving this 
consolidated property form is likely to require some form of coercion--
presumably eminent domain. Both leaseholds and eminent domain 
temporally truncate property interests just as surely as would a fee interest 
that expressly builds in that possibility.   
Indeed, introducing limited tenure forms may be in some cases a less 
invasive and more owner-protective move than applying more coercion to 
an (ostensibly) fuller set of ownership rights. By clearly laying out 
expectations, limited tenure forms align more closely with urban realities. 
They thereby avoid the sort of jarring disconnect that eminent domain 
produces between the rhetoric of unlimited property ownership and the 
reality of coercive reconfiguration.  
We might also understand limited fees as changing the nature of 
coercion associated with private property.182 What makes property coercive 
is not only the state-backed enforcement of exclusion from an individual 
owner’s premises but property’s capacity to thwart larger-scale projects by 
granting holdouts a veto power.  A floating or callable fee can indeed have 
the effect of coercively pushing individual owners out of the way of larger 
projects, but it also frees owners as a group from the coercion of individual 
owners. For similar reasons, we would not say that a unanimity requirement 
is an inherently less coercive way to make decisions than a simple majority 
or supermajority requirement.  It is more protective of the status quo, to be 
sure, but it grants tremendous power to each individual voter to lock the 
status quo in place.183   
 
2. Too Fancy?  
 
No discussion of altered tenure forms can avoid confronting the 
supposed barrier of the numerus clausus doctrine—the idea that property 
should come in just a few standardized forms. Thomas Merrill and Henry 
Smith famously argued that a limited property menu keeps information 
costs low for all those who wish to transact over, or even just avoid 
                                                                                                                            
see also Fennell, supra note 64 (discussing and critiquing Parchomovksy & Siegelman’s approach).    
182 As Eric Freyfogle has observed, a system of private property represents a form of mutual coercion. Eric 
T. Freyfogle, A Good that Transcends: Culture Change and Our Common Home, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1415, 1424 
(2015) (“[T]he private-property approach [to the tragedy of the commons] is merely a form of mutual coercion 
mutually agreed upon, and not necessarily much different from overtly regulatory approaches.”).   
183 For a classic discussion of the costs and benefits of different voting rules, see JAMES BUCHANAN & 
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 68-72 (1962) (examining the tradeoffs between decision costs 
and the costs of a decision adverse to one’s interests as the threshold for decisionmaking changes).   
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encroaching on, property.184 By contrast, allowing idiosyncratic or “fancy” 
property interests will sow confusion, causing information costs to 
skyrocket.185  Should a callable or floating fee be rejected for this reason?   
There are two reasons for a negative answer, even if we assume the 
merits of the information-cost arguments in favor of a limited menu of 
property forms. First, Merrill and Smith’s approach seeks “optimal” 
standardization, not maximum standardization.186 The asserted benefits 
flowing from a fixed and limited tenure menu do not require that the menu 
be limited (for all practical purposes) to only one form, much less that this 
form equate to the FS.  
Second, the callable and floating fee can be constructed without adding 
materially to the existing property menu. The kinds of changes proposed in 
this paper could be readily accomplished using varieties of defeasible 
estates and executory interests—familiar entries in the current list of 
property forms. For reasons similar to those that led to legislation 
concerning common interest communities and conservation easements, 
however, it would be advisable to legislatively define these new property 
forms and give them standardized characteristics and terminology. 
It is here that we see the more important point that might be taken from 
the numerus clausus principle: the significance of providing a recognizable, 
standardized form when introducing a novel type of property.  Not only 
does a standard template allow people to understand what they are getting 
into, it also provides an anchor point for law and policy to coalesce 
around.187  Conversely, a lack of consistency in terminology and operational 
detail can produce confusion and impair uptake.188 None of this counsels 
against property innovations, but it does suggest that care should go into the 
way in which new forms are introduced.   
Instructive in this regard is Pavel Pelikan’s analysis of organizational 
structures for producing incentive systems. He identifies two types of errors 
that such a structure might generate: “surviving errors” (incentive systems 
that persist despite their flaws) and “absent successes” (experiments that 
never occur or are rapidly stamped out despite their value).189 Applied to 
systems for generating property forms, a closed list should make it easier to 
                                                 
184 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus 
Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000). 
185  See id. at 26-34. 
186  See id. at 38-42. 
187 See Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1607 
(2008) (arguing that the limited property forms serve as regulatory platforms).   
188 See, e.g., Ray W. Archer, Land Pooling by Local Government for Planned Urban Development, in LAND 
READJUSTMENT 29, 39 (William A. Doebele, ed., 1982) (suggesting that such problems may explain in part why 
Perth’s experiments in land pooling failed to thrive).   
189 Pavel Pelikan, The Formation of Incentive Mechanisms in Different Economic Systems, in INCENTIVES 
AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 27, 43-44 (Stefan Hedlund, ed., 1987).  These error categories track the dichotomy 
between “type 1” and “type 2” errors—false positive and false negatives—if the system is designed to identify 
socially valuable arrangements. 
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identify and eradicate problematic forms (“surviving errors”). But it would 
also quash experimentation capable of generating useful new forms.190  
To the extent that the numerus clausus principle is reflexively invoked 
to shut down innovation in tenure forms,191 it represents an insidious 
doctrine—one whose costs may go undetected because they mostly take the 
form of “absent successes.”  But at the same time, new forms must be 
introduced in a way that enables them to survive long enough to take hold, 
or they too will join the ranks of the absent successes.   
 
C.  Displacement and Identity Loss 
 
A primary concern with recognizing explicitly callable or floating fees 
is that these tenure forms would lead to more involuntary displacement.  I 
have written elsewhere about the significance of the possessory option—the 
ability to remain in place if one so chooses.192  There is no way to extend an 
option to other parties to end or change a household’s or firm’s tenure 
without at the same time curtailing the possessory option that the owner 
herself holds. The issue is not just one of individual owners being displaced, 
though that is a large concern.  Facilitating or accelerating change within a 
community also presents risks to that community’s collective sense of 
identity, which is shared among its residents.   
There are at least two distinct ways that the new tenure forms sketched 
here might interact with questions of displacement and identity.  First, we 
might wonder if these potential effects would make floating or callable fees 
political nonstarters—either doomed from the beginning or subject to being 
unwound once they are underway.193 Second is the possibility that these 
property forms would heighten the vulnerability of the least politically 
powerful groups to forced displacement. The concern here would not be 
that these new property forms would prove politically impossible, but rather 
that they would prove all too politically possible—with unwanted results. 
I will start by dispensing with two arguments that might seem to moot 
                                                 
190 Pelikan’s analysis focuses on the role of “tacit knowledge” in minimizing both kinds of errors. See id. at 
33-50. Experimentation at the local government level offers an alternative to more centralized methods of control 
that might be better able to make use of such dispersed knowledge.  Moreover, in the present context, I have 
suggested that some new property forms could themselves spur private experimentation into cooperative 
structures—whether for managing change under a floating fee arrangement or banding together to forestall a call 
under a callable fee arrangement.   
191 To be clear, this need not be the import of the numerus clausus doctrine, and it is not what scholars like 
Merrill and Smith are actually saying.  One way of understanding the doctrine is procedural in nature, designed to 
channel changes in tenure forms into legislatures rather than through courts. Another interpretation, suggested in 
the text, is to focus on the significance of standardizing the forms that are introduced, not keeping them out.    
192 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Options for Owners and Outlaws, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. J. 239, 
244-47 (2012). 
193 This point was addressed in a general way above. See text accompanying note 175 supra.  The severity of 
the underlying displacement concerns, considered in this section, may bear on the likelihood of these political 
impediments.   
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concerns about displacement. First is the claim that displacement concerns 
disappear when parties voluntarily opt into a given tenure form, as where a 
currently undeveloped area is newly developed subject to the limited fee. 
As with other “opt in” arrangements like common interest communities, we 
may wonder whether parties fully recognize what they are getting into, and 
ask how voluntary a  choice really is if all of the available housing stock 
within the most desirable areas comes with this proviso. This concern is 
sharpened if the pricing of homes in different areas builds in displacement 
risks, as it presumably would, since lower income people may face a 
constrained choice set.  While the opportunity to opt into different tenure 
forms does make a normative difference, as I will explain, it does not 
provide a complete answer to concerns about displacement.   
Nor is the observation that everyone is already holding a callable fee by 
virtue of their vulnerability to eminent domain a complete answer. While it 
is relevant that vulnerability to displacement does already exist, we cannot 
ignore the possibility that the introduction of more limited estates would 
alter the character or distribution of that vulnerability in potentially 
unwanted ways. Offering expressly callable or floating fees could also 
sidestep the political resistance associated with the exercise of eminent 
domain, which might lead to displacement occurring with greater 
frequency.194 It would be inaccurate to suggest that this would introduce no 
disadvantages relative to eminent domain for anyone.   
We must, therefore, take displacement concerns seriously, both as a 
potential threat to the viability of tenure innovations and as potential 
normative objection to their success. Here it becomes relevant that 
leaseholds that provide little to no long-term tenure protection are common 
in most U.S. jurisdictions.  Most residential leaseholds are for one year or 
less, and the landlord typically has the right to raise the rent or withdraw the 
unit at the end of the lease term, with either action carrying the potential to 
displace the tenant. Compared with these typical leaseholds, a callable or 
floating fee would appear to add tenure protection rather than erode it.  To 
the extent that these new tenure forms made ownership more affordable, 
they could shift households from the relatively less secure tenure form of 
leasing to a relatively more secure tenure form.   
Significantly, however, some jurisdictions do tightly control the 
displacement of leaseholders through rent control and similar measures.  In 
such places, it is not only the FS that can block reconfiguration, but also the 
veto power that is assigned to tenants who are given a statutory right to 
                                                 
194 A similar criticism can be leveled against land assembly districts, an alternative to eminent domain 
proposed in Heller &  Hills, supra note 152.  By design, these districts are meant to increase the amount of land 
assembly by lowering political barriers.  See generally id.  Consequently, it is impossible to claim that the intra-
district coercion upon which the system relies will never operate to the disadvantage of landowners relative to the 
baseline of eminent domain.      
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remain indefinitely.195 Introducing a callable or floating fee into 
jurisdictions where such rights exist would curtail not only the rights of 
affected landlords but also those of their tenants.196 Such a result might 
seem either politically untenable (given the political equilibrium that has 
already produced such strong tenant protections) or normatively suspect 
(because it would seem to unambiguously downgrade rather than upgrade 
the prevailing level of tenure protection in the jurisdiction).  
But the downgrading of tenure protection may not be as unambiguous as 
it seems. If the status quo protections for existing tenants also tend to 
restrict the supply of affordable housing in these jurisdictions, people may 
be either pushed out of the jurisdiction or into less secure arrangements 
(homelessness, staying with family and friends, and so on). The capacity to 
reconfigure and repurpose property, possibly at higher densities, could add 
to the overall housing stock for both tenants and buyers. Instead of 
maximally protecting a subset of those who desire housing in the area and 
offering nothing to the balance, a larger slate of housing choice might be 
available to greater numbers of households.   
Regardless of the empirical reality or the relative normative weighting 
given to the interests of current and potential tenants,197 the political forces 
generating tenant protections might nonetheless block any property 
innovation that would have the effect of reducing protections for tenants.  
An interesting question, then, is how and whether flexible tenure 
arrangements could accommodate strong demands for tenure security. One 
possibility would be to designate certain portions of an urban area for long-
term residency while other areas were designated for callable or floating 
fees. The result might be valuable sorting into more and less permanent 
forms of property—just as investors can elect callable or call-protected 
financial instruments. Even if more dispossessions occurred under this 
approach, they might be channeled toward those who are least bothered by 
them.198   
Troublingly, however, such approaches might also seem to channel 
dispossession toward those who are least able to pay the premium for 
permanence.  But this need not be the case.  Call-protected tenancies might 
                                                 
195 This right is of course subject to eminent domain, but the political limits on that course of action may 
remove much of the associated threat.   
196 Absent an exception or override, curtailment in the landlord’s estate entails a curtailment in the tenant’s 
estate as well; the landlord cannot lease out an interest greater than that which she herself holds. See, e.g., Henry 
E. Smith, The Elements of Possession, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION 65, 91 (Yun-chien Chang, 
ed., 2015) (describing the rule of nemo dat quod non habet which holds that “one cannot give that which one does 
not have”).    
197 See Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 355-71 (1986) (discussing 
arguments for favoring tenants already present in the community through rent control).   
198 Governments may already attempt to steer eminent domain away from those who will suffer the most, at 
least if they are politically well-organized. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent 
Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV.101, 110–21 (2006).  But the callable fee would do so more consistently and openly.     
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offer one way of distributing permanence to those who gain the most from 
it, whether or not they can pay for it.  Callable or floating fees might also be 
spatially distributed in ways that would address equity concerns.   It cannot 
be ignored in this discussion that under the status quo, low income people 
are generally more vulnerable to eminent domain, more likely to occupy 
leaseholds rather than freeholds, and at greater risk for foreclosure. Simply 
making that vulnerability to displacement more transparent, as the callable 
and floating fees would do, would make it more politically salient and more 
amenable to being addressed directly through law and policy.199   
A related concern is that these new tenure forms would undervalue and 
disrupt the deep connections that people form with land.200 There are 
several responses.  First, if people are heterogeneous in their connections to 
land, they may be able to self-sort into more or less rooted and endless 
estates. Second, some versions of the floating fee could actually increase the 
security with which people would remain members of the same community, 
even if not occupying precisely the same physical footprint.201 Third, it is an 
open normative question whether society ought to encourage people to 
make large emotional investments in remaining in precisely the same 
physical location over time.202 People’s willingness to move for new job 
opportunities, for example, can be economically valuable. Absolute 
immobility may no longer even serve as a particularly good proxy for the 
important goals of maintaining ties to family and social support networks. 
Some degree of disruption may, indeed, be generative in breaking up 
existing patterns and enabling more inclusive and vibrant communities. 
Stability looks less attractive as a normative value when one realizes its role 
in perpetuating existing residential patterns, including segregation. Drawing 
floating fee zones that straddle boundary lines between racially identifiable 
neighborhoods, for example, might shake up ordinary metrics of housing 
search and produce greater prospects for integration.203 Callable fees could 
likewise offer controlled opportunities to introduce perturbations in existing 
housing and land use arrangements, which could powerfully disrupt self-
                                                 
199 This might, for example, be an area in which the disparate impact cause of action under the Fair Housing 
Act could offer traction.  See Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities 
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (recognizing a disparate impact cause of action in the Fair Housing Act).   
200 For an illuminating discussion of the connections between property and memory, see generally Eduardo 
M. Peñalver, Property’s Memories, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1071 (2011). 
201 This raises the issue of the scale at which rootedness should be assessed. See YI-FU TUAN, SPACE AND 
PLACE 149-60 (1977) (emphasizing the role of scale in determining the meaning of one’s “homeland”); id. at 182 
(“For nomads the cyclical exigencies of life yield a sense of place at two scales: the camps, and the far larger 
territory within which they move.”).      
202 The extent to which law and policy can shape people’s expectations surrounding property has been the 
subject of some recent empirical work. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 
87 WASH. U. L. REV. 449, 479-84 (2010). 
203 See Lee Anne Fennell, Searching for Fair Housing (unpublished draft dated October 2015). Cf. Aaron J.  
Saiger, Local Government Without Tiebout, 41 URB. L. 93 (2009) (proposing periodic redrawing of local 
government boundaries to thwart efforts to sort into exclusive, wealth-stratified communities).  I am grateful to 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig and Paul Gowder for discussions on this point.    
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reinforcing patterns.204  
Fostering an enduring sense of identity with particular places does 
require that the built environment exhibit some degree of stability over 
time.205 The costs of disposable property are evident.206 But keeping too 
much of the past in place also impose costs—including stifling creativity. In 
discussing historic preservation, Yi-Fu Tuan offers the arresting metaphor 
of an individual who must decide what to keep and what to throw away to 
survive in what threatens to become an increasingly cluttered home.207 
Along similar lines, Edward Glaeser has suggested placing a budget on the 
number of properties that can be historically preserved, which would keep a 
stable fraction of the city open to redesign and redevelopment.208 
Regardless of the tenure forms that communities choose to employ, they 
cannot avoid confronting issues of urban permanence and change. 
Heterogeneity in tenure alternatives offers one way to manage that tension. 
Like museums that employ a mix of permanent and temporary exhibits, 
cities might designate areas for more frequent remaking or relative 
permanence.209 Doing so would offer a more flexible alternative than a hard 
cap on the number of historic buildings, and one that would recognize 
complementarities among adjacent properties.210   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For centuries, the FS powerfully aligned incentives by extending 
perpetual dominion over a specified physical domain. It proved versatile 
enough to maintain its dominant position even as social and economic 
conditions changed in profound ways. But a perpetual temporal reach tied 
to specific geographic coordinates has shifted over time from a core source 
                                                 
204  See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 203 (examining the potential for random variation to disrupt segregative 
patterns; Richard R.W. Brooks, The Banality of Racial Inequality (reviewing DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING 
RACISM (2014), 124 YALE L.J. 2626, 2655-61 (2015) (explaining how introducing random variation into urn-
filling protocols could break the entrenched pattern that is illustrated by the Polya urn model). Cf. Ken Kollman, 
John H. Miller, & Scott E. Page, Political Institutions and Sorting in a Tiebout Model, 87 AM ECON REV. 977, 
989 (1997) (describing how the introduction of random policy mutations in a multi-jurisdictional model can 
facilitate a shift from a less valuable local optimum to a more valuable overall configuration).   
205 TUAN, supra note 201, at 159 (discussing the significance of landmarks as “visible signs [that] serve to 
enhance a people’s sense of identity; they encourage awareness of and loyalty to place.”).   
206 See, e.g., Elisabeth Braw, Japan’s Disposable Home Culture Is an Environmental and Financial 
Headache, THE GUARDIAN, May 2, 2014 (describing problems arising out of a culture of building homes to be 
destroyed in less  than 30 years).  I thank David Schleicher for alerting me to this example. 
207 TUAN, supra note 201, at 196-97.   
208 See EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY 162 (suggesting that “in a city like New York, the 
landmarks commission should have a fixed number of buildings, perhaps five thousand, that it may protect.”). 
209 Cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Balancing the Zoning Budget, 62 CASE W. RES. L.  REV. 
81 (2011) (proposing that limits on growth implemented within a city be offset by increased rights to build 
elsewhere in the city). 
210 See Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic Preservation, 
33 STAN. L. REV. 473, 507-08 (1981) (discussing the “tout ensemble” doctrine articulated in  Maher v. City of 
New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975)).   
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of value to a real liability in urban areas. It is time to rethink what we want 
from estates in land and to ask whether the FS can still deliver it.   
What is needed now are property forms that can cope with the spatial 
interdependence that characterizes life in and around cities. This paper has 
attempted to convince readers of this fact. I have suggested some directions 
in which property might develop if we could escape the gravitational pull of 
the FS, but the discussion here has been intentionally short on operational 
detail.  I do not purport to have hit upon the best way, or ways, to revise 
tenure forms for the city. What I hope to have done instead is put on the 
agenda—or at least on the table for debate—the idea of revising some of the 
most foundational attributes of the FS.   
Property is a human invention,211 and one that we must reinvent as 
conditions change.  It is no longer enough for the law to protect an owner’s 
domain and forestall overt land use conflicts, when the opportunity cost of 
failing to put together complementary uses in valuable patterns looms ever 
larger. We must loosen the grip of the rooted, everlasting estate on our 
imaginations if we want to build cities that are flexible enough to flourish. 
                                                 
211 See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) (“Property rights serve human values.”).    
